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PRESIDENTIAL REGULATION OF
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12,954 DEBARMENT OF
CONTRACTORS WHO HIRE
PERMANENT STRIKER REPLACEMENTS
MICHAEL H. LERoY*
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty
of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually present themselves. Just
what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had
they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials
almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to
interpret for Pharaoh.
—Justice Robert H. Jackson,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer'
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 8, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order
12,954, authorizing debarment of federal contractors who hire perma-
*Associate Professor, Institute of Labor 8c Industrial Relations and College of Law, University
of Illinois. I thank my family, Janet LeRoy, Sarah LeRoy and Benjamin LeRoy, for their encour-
agement and patience. In memory of my loving aunt, Margaret Maate, a survivor of the Holocaust,
and her husband and son, respectively, Mihaly Maate and Istvan Maate, who died in a Nazi
concentration camp.
1 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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nent striker replacements. 2 He cited the need to promote economy
and efficiency in the federal government's procurement of goods and
services,3 but undoubtedly, his motivation was to woo organized labor
after he strongly supported NAFTA4 and failed to persuade Congress
to enact a law to ban hiring of permanent striker replacements.' Sew
eral prominent employer groups immediately sued to invalidate the
order.6
This matter has significance for the continuing public policy de-
bate on whether employers should be prohibited from hiring perma-
nent striker replacements. But it has greater significance because it
exposes a largely unnoticed phenomenon of presidential regulation
of private employment practices. Executive orders in World War II
directing federal contractors to end race discrimination are the origi-
nal source of affirmative action principles. Recently, the Supreme-
Court subjected some of these principles to strict scrutiny,? while
2 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 29 C.F.R. §§ 270.1 to —.23 (1995).
Id. § 270.2 (a).
4 See Labor Berates Clinton Over NAFTA, Seems Cool Toward Reconciliation, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 222, at AA-1 (Nov. 19, 1993) (reporting on the significant rift between unions and
the Clinton Administration prompted by the President's support for NAFTA).
5 At the AFL-CIO's (national federation of labor unions) strong urging the Workplace
Fairness Act was introduced. The bill proposed to amend the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") by making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to offer, or to grant, the status
of permanent replacement employee to an individual for performing bargaining unit work for
the employer during a labor dispute." H.R. 5, S. 55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). President
Clinton's election raised unions' hopes that this bill would pass. Labor's Agenda Seen Rising Under
Clinton; Family Leave Legislation Tops List, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at A-6 (Jan. 19, 1993)
[hereinafter Labor's Agenda Seen Rising Under Clinton]. This would have reversed the bill's
misfortunes resulting from President Bush's threatened veto. See Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict
Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at A-9 (June 17, 1992);
Administration Policy Statement on S 55 Workplace Fairness Act, June 9, 1992, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 112, at F-1 (June 10, 1992) [hereinafter Policy Statement on S 55]. But the bill failed
on a Senate vote to cutoff a threatened filibuster. Senate Vote to End Filibuster on Striker Replacement
Fails 53-47, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Nu. 132, at AA-1 (July 13, 1994) [hereinafter Senate Vote Fails];
Defeat of Striker Replacement Bill a Victory for Business Coalition, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133,
at AA-1 (July 14, 1994) [hereinafter Victory for Business Coalition). Three of the four senators
from the President's and Vice President's home states voted against the bill, indicating the
Administration's failure to swing critical votes for heading off a filibuster. See Victory for Business
Coalition, supra.
6 Complaint and Memorandum for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Cham-
ber of Commerce v, Reich, 886 F. Supp, 66 (D.D.C. 1995) (No. 95-0503), available in Complaint
and Memorandum Supporting Preliminary Injunction Against Executive Order on Permanent Striker
Replacements, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at E -31 (Mar. 16, 1995) [hereinafter Chamber of
Commerce Complaint].
7 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995) (holding that federal affirmative
action programs are subject to strict scrutiny and are constitutional only if they redress past
discrimination). The case involved an award of a road-building contract funded by the United
States Department of Transportation to a prime contractor who received a bonus for letting a
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Congress' and California's governors severely challenged these prin-
ciples.
Thus, Executive Order 12,954 raises the larger issue of whether
a president may regulate private conduct—specifically, employment
practices—without intruding on Congress's lawmaking powers. This
issue is underscored by the fact that Congress seriously considered a
bill to prohibit employers from hiring permanent striker replacements,
and defeated it by a narrow margin. 10
 By effectively implementing
the terms of this bill, Executive Order 12,954 appears to be an end-
run around Congress." This raises a fundamental constitutional issue:
whether the contemporary President and Congress share lawmaking
powers, or whether the President's powers are confined to those ex-
pressly enumerated in Article 11. 12
subcontract to a minority-owned firm, even though a white-owned firm was low-bidder. This
affirmative action program is rooted in an executive order of President Kennedy. See Exec. Order
No. 11,114, 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963).
8 The Wall Street Journal reported on Rep. Charles Canaday's plan to introduce a bill to ban
all federal programs that provide for race or gender preferences in hiring, contracting, or any
other federally funded benefit. SeePaul M. Barrett & Gerald F. Seib, House Republican Opens Drive
to Ban Affirmative Action, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1995, at B7. If passed, this legislation would
effectively repeal Executive Order 11,246, the most comprehensive presidential order implement-
ing affirmative action employment practices for federal contractors. See 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319
(1965).
g See, e.g., G. Pascal Zachary, Wilson Is Expected to Move to Reduce California Affirmative Action
Rules, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1995, at B6 (reporting on Governor Wilson's plan to issue an executive
order abolishing more than 100 advisory panels that encourage state agencies to help minorities
and women, change hiring and promotional practices of state agencies, and lower the share of
contracting dollars given to minorities by state training agencies).
ID See infra section III.C.
II Sen. Robert Dole described the order as a "misguided directive" and a "transparent" power
grab, as well as a politically inspired end-run around Congress. Deborah Billings, Striker Replace-
ments: Senate Democrats Keep Clinton Order Alive; Bridgestone/Firestone Seeks Relief in Court, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at AA-I, AA-2 (Mar. 16, 1995) [hereinafter Billings, Striker Replacements].
Paul Huard of the National Association of Manufacturers said the order "clearly ignores congres-
sional and judicial intent . . . [by] seeking to 'enact' changes in law that have been consistently
rejected [by Congress] .... And by doing so, the executive seeks to regulate issues clearly
delegated to the Congress." Deborah Billings, Business Groups Slam President Clinton for Issuing
Striker Replacement Order, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 66, at A-1 (Apr. 6, 1995). Jeffrey McGuiness,
President of the Labor Policy Association, said the order "raises fundamental separation of powers
questions under the Constitution. Congress should really look at who is going to set employment
policy in this country—the president through executive fiat or the legislative branch through
enforcement of laws." Deborah Billings, Reich Says Replacement Order Could Be Unveiled as Early
as Today, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at AA-I (Mar. 8, 1995).
11
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting the President status as Commander in Chief, and power
to grant reprieves and pardons for federal crimes, and with the consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, appoint ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, Supreme Court judges and other
officers of' the United States); id. § 3 (granting power to convene or adjourn Congress, and the
duty (not a power) to "take Care that the Laws be Faithfully executed").
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As this Article demonstrates, the stakes here are high because
virtually all presidents since Franklin Roosevelt have used their general
power over procurement to place conditions on private actors who do
business with the United States government's Some orders have been
issued with no congressional authorization," while others, such as
Executive Order 12,954, have cited only general and somewhat vague
authority. 15
Furthermore, court challenges to these executive orders have been
rare, and have succeeded only once.' 6 Consequently, there is little
jurisprudence providing guidance on congressional delegation of law-
making power to validate these orders. The employer lawsuit challeng-
ing Executive Order 12,954 provides a rare opportunity for courts to
supply this guidance, but this poses a genuine risk to the present
balance of power between Congress, the President, and the judiciary.
Thus, if Clinton's order is successfully overturned by the courts
rather than by Congress, 17 there would be two important effects. First,
because such a ruling would add significantly to a dearth of precedent,
it would have broad regulatory implications by exposing to court chal-
lenges other executive orders with lawmaking attributes. These might
include, in addition to those regulating employment, orders concern-
ing the environment, drug interdiction, nutritional standards, and
immigration, among others.'s
The second, and more immediate and certain effect, would be
removal of an important protection for workers represented by unions.
' 3 The Clinton Administration argued that under Building & Constr. Trades Council v.
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 U.S. 218 (1993), the "NLRA . . . does not preempt
action by the government when it is acting, as here, as a purchaser of goods or services, rather
than as a regulator or policymaker." Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction, Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich, 886 F. Supp. 66 (D.D.C.
1995) (No. 95-0503), available in Clinton Administration Defense of Executive Order 12,954 on
Permanent Replacement of Striking Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at E-1 (Apr. 5, 1995).
14 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 8773, 6 Fed. Reg. 2777 (1941).
18 E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,092, 43 Fed. Reg. 51,375 (1978).
1 " See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
17 Republicans immediately responded to the order by introducing legislation to overturn it.
Senate Faces Another Cloture Vote on Striker Replacement Issue, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, at
A-4 (Dec. 19, 1995). Referring to the order's possible effect on employer rights to hire permanent
striker replacements, Sen. Nancy Kassebaurn (R., Kan.) viewed this as a question of whether
Congress "is prepared to allow the president to overturn 60 years of labor law with the stroke of
a pen." Billings, Striker Replacements, supra note 11, at AA-1. The bill, H.R. 1176, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995), was approved on a 22-16 vote by the House Economic and Educational Opportu-
nities Committee in June 1995. House Committee Approves Measure to Nullify Executive Order, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 115, at AA-1 (June 15, 1995) [hereinafter House Committee Moves to Nullify].
18 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936).
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Commentators say that growing employer reliance on the striker-re-
placement doctrine has significantly undermined the effectiveness of
federal labor policy in protecting worker interests through collective
bargaining.'" The order affects federal contractors who recently hired
or threatened to hire permanent striker replacements, such as Cater-
pillar,20 Bridgestone/Firestone, 2 ' Pirelli Armstrong Tire, 22 and Diamond
Walnuts,23 by compelling them to limit their strategy for responding to
a strike. Since the order was issued when more employers hired or
threatened to hire permanent striker replacements, 24 and since it ap-
plies to 28,000 employers and their workers, 25 its potential effect is
considerable.
19 See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve
Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 421 (1992) ("Mt is clear that the Mackay Radio
decision severely undermined the statutorily protected right of employees to strike."); Daniel
PoHitt, Mackay Radio; turn It Off Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. RYA,. 295, 306 (1991) ("[T]he Mackay
Radio doctrine is an increasingly effective tool with which employers can undermine employees'
efforts to organize themselves and to meaningfully bargain with their employer"); Note, One
Strike and You're Out? Creating An Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine 106 HARV. L. REV.
669, 674 (1993) ("Employers currently abuse the right of hiring permanent replacements in order
to rid themselves of unions, thus destroying the benefits that unions provide.").
E.g., Foreign Commercial Service Opens at U.S. Embassy, Commerce Says, Fed. Contracts Daily
(BNA) (Apr. 3, 1991) (reporting that Caterpillar was awarded a contract to aid in oil field
reconstruction); Lieberman Introduces Bill to Encourage Cooperation Between DOD Labs, Industry,
Fed. Contracts Daily (BNA) (Feb. 26, 1993) (reporting that Caterpillar was working with Lawrence
Livermore since 1988 to develop sophisticated earthmoving equipment in order to compete
against foreign manufacturers); Protest Denied Where Low Bid, Protester Needed Major Changes, Fed.
Contracts Daily (BNA), at D-2 (Mar. 21, 1994) (reporting that Caterpillar was awarded a contract
for scraper-tractors suitable for air transport by the Defense Logistics Agency).
21 In 1994 Bridgestone/Firestone hired replacements, who were eventually given permanent
status, for 2300 striking members of the United Rubber Workers. Raju Narisetti, Bridgestone/Fire-
stone Begins to Hire Permanent Replacements for Strikers, WA LI Sr. J., Jan. 5, 1995, at AS. That same
year, Bridgestone did $12 million worth of business as a first -tier federal contractor. Chamber of
Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-33, E -54,
22 Strike at Pirelli Armstrong Plants Set to End March 13 with Return to Work Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 47, at A-9 (Mar. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Pirelli Armstrong Strike to End] (reporting that
850 strikers were permanently replaced after beginning a strike on July 15, 1994, but were later
offered reinstatement when the NLRB found that the company's unilateral implementation of
contract terms converted this economic strike to an unfair labor practice strike).
25 Diamond Walnut Should Be Sanctioned Under Striker Order, Teamsters Say, Fed. Contracts
Daily (BNA), at 9-5 (Apr. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Teamsters Say Diamond Walnut Should Be
Sanctioned] (reporting that this large food processor who permanently replaced 500 strikers has
a $1 million federal contract with the Department of Agriculture to supply walnuts for school
lunches).
24 U.S. GF.N. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES AND THE USE
OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN THE 1970s AND 1980s, at 13 & tbl. II.1 (1991) [herein-
after GAO STRIKE REPLACEMENT REPORT] (reporting that employers threatened to hire replace-
ments in one-third of all strikes in the 1980s and hired replacements in one-sixth of all strikes).
25 See Deborah Billings & Alexis Simendinger, President Issues Order Barring Permanent Re-
placement of Strikers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at AA-1 (Mar. 9, 1995).
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Section II presents research on 113 executive orders regulating
private employment since 1941. These orders comprise two categories:
those, like Executive Order 12,954, affecting collective bargaining, and
those aiming to end discriminatory employment practices. The latter
are relevant because they illustrate that presidents have exercised law-
making powers to regulate private employment and, in doing so, have
used their control over federal contracting to achieve a social or eco-
nomic policy goal.
Section II.0 presents court challenges to these orders. It shows
that courts have rarely intervened in this regulatory arena, and only
once have overturned such an order. This discussion explains why the
current employer lawsuit challenging Executive Order 12,954 is so
unusual and frames the potential significance of this litigation.
Section III examines the elements of Executive Order 12,954 and
explores events leading up to the order's issuance. Section III.A briefly
traces the evolution of the permanent striker-replacement doctrine,
while section III.B presents evidence that replacement strikes occurred
more often than before from the 1970s through 1990s. Section III.0
presents a history of recent striker-replacement legislation preceding
Clinton's order that Congress failed to enact, while section III.D details
the provisions of Executive Order 12,954.
Section IV analyzes the constitutionality of Executive Order 12,954.
Section 1V.A focuses on executive orders during the 1950s to end race
discrimination in private workplaces and contrasts this evolution with
congressional hostility to desegregation. These orders effectively made
law by regulating private employment, even though they were incon-
sistent with congressional sentiment. They show, therefore, that presi-
dents have used their power to manage government contracts to pursue
policy goals opposed by Congress without violating the separation-of-
powers doctrine. These precedents support the conclusion that Execu-
tive Order 12,954 does not violate that constitutional doctrine.
Section 1V.B explains how Clinton acted within the limits that
Congress delegated to presidents under the Federal Procurement and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 ("FPASA"). Presidents have had
broad discretion in placing social or economic policy conditions on
federal contracts while pursuing economy and efficiency under FPASA.
This section will show that Executive Order 12,954's premise for de-
barring contractors who hire permanent striker replacements—that
this employment practice may lead to problems in product or service
quality or timely contract performance—is rational by examining how
some recent replacement strikes may have affected government pro-
curement. In addition, my research on 299 replacement strikes shows
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that these strikes have lasted much longer in the 1980s and early 1990s
than any period analyzed since the 1930s. This evidence supports
Clinton's policy assumption that replacement strikes may hinder eco-
nomical and efficient performance of contracts by exposing govern-
ment procurement to strike disorder or disruptions for an average of
eight months.
Section IV.0 addresses the employer argument that Executive
Order 12,954 impermissibly intrudes on the National Labor Relations
Act's ("NLRA") regulation of strikes. It shows the fallacy of this argu-
ment by drawing on executive orders issued by Presidents Nixon,
Carter, and Bush that interfered with substantive rights under the
NLRA. This section concludes that Clinton's order is supported by, and
consistent with, precedents of limited executive intrusion in the pri-
vate-sector arena of collective bargaining.
The concluding section shows how the employer lawsuit challeng-
ing the order affects two important constitutional matters. First, judi-
cial oversight of executive orders is likely to increase if Executive Order
12,954 is struck down. While this Article presents evidence supporting
the public policy goals of Executive Order 12,954, it suggests constitu-
tional alternatives to nullify it: Congress may enact a law to repeal it,
or voters may elect a president who will void it or not enforce it.
Second, invalidation of this order would limit a remarkably effective
power that presidents since Lincoln have used to curb majoritarian
abuses by Congress and state legislatures while introducing unpopular
social and economic change.
II. EXECUTIVE ORDERS PRECEDING EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,954
AFFECTING PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
This section presents research on 113 executive orders preceding
Executive Order 12,954 that regulated private employment. 26 These
26 These orders do not include those that regulate the employment relationship between the
federal government and its employees. Among the latter, President Kennedy's Exec. Order No.
10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962), established collective bargaining rights for federal employees.
In 1969, President Nixon clarified and strengthened these rights in Exec. Order No. 11,491, 34
Fed. Reg. 17,605 (1969). These orders were later codified by Congress when it permitted Presi-
dential Reorganization Plans No. 1 & 2 of 1978 to become law by failing to pass legislation
rejecting these plans within a specified time and when it enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7104-05 (1994) (Plan No. 2, abolishing the Civil Service Commission and
replacing it with the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit System Protection Board);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994) (Plan No. 1, transferring enforcement of civil rights, age, equal pay,
and disability discrimination from the Civil Service Commission to the EEOC).
In addition, President Ronald Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986),
imposing drug-free workplace standards on federal employees, led to enactment of the Drug-Free
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orders fall into two distinct categories, those affecting private-sector
collective bargaining and those aiming to end discriminatory employ-
ment practices. Both groups must be considered to evaluate the con-
stitutionality of Executive Order 12,954. On its face, Clinton's order
pertains to collective bargaining, but it also resembles employment
discrimination orders because many of those orders used contract
debarment to penalize noncompliance. The purpose of this analysis is
to determine whether Executive Order 12,954 is novel or consistent
with earlier executive orders.
Section II.0 shows that court challenges to these orders are rare,
and except for one extraordinary case, courts have not struck down
any order. This section concludes that the current employer challenge
to Executive Order 12,954 should be dismissed. Nevertheless, there is
more than an abstract possibility that this order will be overturned.
During oral arguments appellate judges made comments suggesting
they are sympathetic to the employers' position.?' Given this possibility,
it is important to realize that such a ruling would establish the first
precedent having broad application.
A. Executive Orders Affecting Collective Bargaining
President Franklin Roosevelt issued more than 1800 executive
orders during his presidency, many of which were purely military in
character. 28 But many directly regulated private employers and workers,
making Roosevelt the first president to exercise this power in this
manner. These numerous orders fell into five basic categories: orders
creating dispute-settlement machinery to resolve labor-management
disputes; orders resulting in government seizure and operation of
private workplaces affected by labor disturbances; orders regulating
wage rates, including those negotiated through collective bargaining;
orders regulating premium-time wages and hours; and orders to end
race discrimination in employment.
Workplace Act of 1988. See Pub. L, No. 100-.690, tit. V, § 5152, 102 Stat. 4304, 4304 (1988)
(codified at 41 U.S.C. § 701 (1994)). This law requires many federal contractors to implement
drug-free workplace policies. Id.
27 See Bernard Mower, District of Columbia Circuit Hears Debate aver Review of Striker Replace-
ment Order, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 116, at A-1, A-2 (June 16, 1995) (reporting judge Buckley's
characterizatiOn of the order as a "Draconian threat" and a life and death" matter for employers,
and Judge Wald's comments suggesting that the district court may have erred in denying an
employers' motion to enjoin the order because of lack of ripeness).
28 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 8143, 4 Fed. Reg. 2179 (1939) (ironically, issued to secure a
defensive sea area in and about Pearl Harbor two years before Japan's surprise attack).
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Peaceful labor-management relations were deemed essential to
win World War II. To this end, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8716. 29
It created the National Defense Mediation Board" and granted it
jurisdiction to settle serious labor disputes by a variety of means. 3 '
Exceptional people were named to this Board" and served not in an
honorific capacity, but as roving Solomonic advisors. Frequently the
Board dispatched three- or four-person teams, with a representative
from labor, management, and the public." For example, a complicated
dispute involved International Harvester plants in Illinois, Wisconsin,
and Ohio, and several unions. In March and April, an improbable
group of mediators—the president of the University of Wisconsin, the
publisher of The Washington Post, the chairman of the board of Stand-
ard Oil Co., and a representative of the American Federation of La-
bor—brokered an interim agreement and appointed a noted econo-
mist from the University of Wisconsin to serve as a fact-finder during
subsequent negotiations.s 4 These important manufacturing plants were
kept open and running as a result."
As the war deepened, Roosevelt took even stronger measures that
included seizing manufacturing plants affected by strikes. Executive
Order 9017 resulted after the President pressured unions and employ-
ers to avoid strikes and lockouts during the remainder of the war. 36 It
2'3 Exec. Order No. 8716, 6 Fed. Reg. 1532 (1941). The policy preamble to the order states,
"[lit is essential in the present emergency that employers and employees engaged in production
or transportation of materials necessary to national defense shall exert every possible effort to
assure that all work necessary for national defense shall proceed without interruption and with
all possible speed . . . ."
30 Id. § 1(a)—(b) (board composed of three disinterested persons representing the public,
and four representatives respectively from unions and employers).
31 Id. § 2 (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to certify disputes that threaten to obstruct
interstate commerce to the board; and authorizing the board to use voluntary arbitration, or
other dispute settlement methods, and to investigate issues, conduct hearings, formulate recom-
mendations, and make findings and recommendations public).
32 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, BULL. No. 714, REPORT ON THE WORK
OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD MARCH 19, 1941- JANUARY 12, 1942 app. C at 53-54
(1942) [hereinafter DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD REPORT].
33 See id. at 95 (reporting Case No. 3, a dispute between Cornell-Dubilier Corp. and the
Electrical Workers, in which a strike was settled on recommendations made by Frank P. Graham,
president of the University of North Carolina, Cyrus Ching, vice president of U.S. Rubber Corp.,
and Thomas Watt, a representative from the American Federation of Labor).
54 See id. at 95-97.
33 See id. at 96 (parties agreed that "all plants are to be kept open and production for defense
maintained pending recommendation for settlement from the Board").
36 Exec. Orcter No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942). The order declared:
[B]y reason of the state of war declared to exist . . the national interest demands
that there shall be no interruption of any work which contributes to the effective
prosecution of the war. .. . [Ais a result of a conference of representatives of labor
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created the National War Labor Boards .' while terminating the media-
tion board,38 and gave the new board sweeping powers to settle labor
disputes.s9 In an extraordinary section, the order, without any legisla-
tive authority or supporting judicial opinion, declared that a series of
national labor laws that were modified by this order were not super-
seded or in conflict with it. 49 Because rail employees were subject to a
statute that provided an already detailed settlement process, Roosevelt
issued a separate executive order tailored to that law."'
Numerous orders followed providing for the federal govern-
ment to seize and operate private workplaces. In general, these
were issued after a union42 or an employer's refused to be bound
and industry which met at the call of the President on December 17, 1941, it has
been agreed that for the duration of the war there shall be no strikes or lockouts,
and that all labor disputes shall be settled by peaceful means, and that a National
War Labor Board be established for the peaceful adjustment of such disputes.
Id.
37 Id. § 1 (authorizing the President to name four commissioners respectively from labor,
management, and the public).
39 Id. § 6. This board's work appears in DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD REPORT, supra note 32.
39 See id. § 3. The dispute settlement process is specified as follows:
(a) The parties shall first resort to direct negotiations or to the procedures
provided in a collective bargaining agreement.
(b) If not settled in this manner, the Commissioners of Conciliation of the
Department of Labor shall be notified if they have not already intervened in the
dispute.
(c) If not promptly settled by conciliation, the Secretary of Labor shall certify the
dispute to the Board, provided, however, that the Board in its discretion after
consultation with the Secretary may take jurisdiction of the dispute on its own
motion. After it takes jurisdiction, the Board shall finally determine the dispute,
and for this purpose may use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under
rules established by the Board.
Id.
4') See id. § 7 (providing that "[N]othing herein shall be construed as superseding or in
conflict with the . . . Railway Labor Act . . . the National Labor Relations Act . . . the Fair Labor
Standards Act . . . or the Act relating to the rate of wages for laborers and mechanics").
41 See Exec. Order No. 9299, 8 Fed. Reg. 1669 (1943). This order froze employee compensa-
tion subject to Exec. Order No. 9250, 7 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1942), but expressly preserved the dispute
settlement processes under the Railway Labor Act, such as negotiations resulting in voluntary
agreements, or agreements assisted by conciliation and arbitration. Id. § 1.
42 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9108, 7 Fed. Reg. 2201 (1942). The policy preamble premised
seizure and operation of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Co. on a finding that "the
National War Labor Board ... directed the dispute be submitted to arbitration ... and the
representative of the employees have agreed thereto, but the company has refused and continues
to refuse to submit the dispute to arbitration, despite urgent requests by the National War Labor
Board and by the President." Id. § 4.
43 E.g., Exec. Order No. 9340, 8 Fed. Reg. 5695 (1943). The policy preamble premised seizure
and operation of various coal mines on a finding that,
the officers of the United Mine Workers of America have refused to submit to the
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by settlement terms directed by the National War Labor Board.
Roosevelt's earliest seizure order cited no legislative authority for
taking this action, 44 in contrast to those issued near the end of
the war. 45
These orders affected a wide array of industries, including basic
manufacturing,46 coal production and processing, 47 motor transportation,48
machinery established for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes in violation of
the agreement on the part of labor and industry that there shall be no strikes or
lockouts for the duration of the war . . . .
Id. § 2.
44 See Exec. Order No. 9220, 7 Fed. Reg. 6413 (1942) (authorizing the Secretary of the Navy
to seize and operate General Cable Company's plant at Bayonne, New jersey).
45 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9393, 9 Fed. Reg. 14,877 (1943) (basing seizure of Illinois coal
mines on "the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States,
particularly the War Labor Disputes Act").
46 See Exec, Order No. 8773, 6 Fed. Reg. 2777 (1941) (seizing North American Aviation),
relinquished by Exec. Order No. 8814, 6 Fed. Reg. 3253 (1941); Exec. Order No. 8868, 6 Fed, Reg.
4349 (1941) (seizing Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock CO, relinquished by Exec. Order No.
9012, 7 Fed. Reg. 145 (1942); Exec. Order No. 8928, 6 Fed. Reg. 5559 (1941) (seizing Air
Associates, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9225, 7 Fed, Reg. 6627 (1942) (seizing S.A. Woods Machine
Co.); Exec. Order No. 9229, 7 Fed. Reg. 6630 (1942) (seizing General Cable Corp.); Exec. Order
No. 9254, 7 Fed. Reg. 8333 (1942) (seizing Triumph Explosives, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9351, 8
Fed. Reg. 8097 (1943) (seizing Howarth Pivoted Bearings Co.); Exec. Order No. 9375, 8 Fed.
Reg. 12,253 (1943) (seizing Atlantic Basin Iron Works), relinquished by Exec. Order No, 9377, 8
Fed. Reg. 12,963 (1943); Exec. Order No. 9399, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,269 (1943) (seizing Remington-
Rand Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9395B, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,957 (1943) (seizing leather manufacturing
plants in Massachusetts), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9403, 8 Fed, Reg. 16,957 (1943); Exec.
Order No, 9400, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,641 (1943) (seizing Los Angeles Shipbuilding and DryDock
Corp.); Exec. Order No, 9416, 9 Fed. Reg. 936 (1944) (seizing York Safe & Lock Co.), relinquished
by Exec. Order No. 9527, 10 Fed. Reg. 424 (1945); Exec. Order No. 9435, 9 Fed. Reg. 4063 (1944)
(seizing Jenkins Bros.); Exec. Order 9436, 9 Fed. Reg. 4063 (1944) (seizing Ken-Rad Tube and
Lamp Co. & Ken-Rad Transmitting Tube Corp.); Exec. Order No. 9438, 9 Fed. Reg. 4459 (1944)
(seizing Montgomery Ward & Co.); Exec. Order No. 9443, 9 Fed. Reg. 5395 (1944) (seizing
Hummer Mfg.); Exec. Order No. 9466, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,139 (1944) (seizing several machine shops);
Exec. Order No. 9473, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,613 (1944) (seizing International Nickel Co.); Exec. Order
No, 9475A, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (1944) (seizing Hughes Tool Co.); Exec. Order No. 9477, 9 Fed.
Reg. 10,941 (1944) (seizing Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co.); Exec. Order No. 9480, 9 Fed. Reg.
11,143 (1944) (seizing Twentieth Century BrassWorks, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9484, 9 Fed. Reg.
11,731 (1944) (seizing Farrell Cheek Steel Co.); Exec. Order No. 9508, 9 Fed. Reg. 15,079 (1944)
(seizing Montgomery Ward & Co); Exec. Order No. 9511, 10 Fed. Reg. 549 (1945) (seizing
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.); Exec. Order No. 9523, 10 Fed. Reg. 2133 (1945) (seizing
American Enka Corp.).
47 See Exec. Order No. 9320, 8 Fed. Reg. 3687 (1943); Exec. Order No, 9393, 8 Fed. Reg.
14,877 (1943); Exec. Order No, 9469, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,343 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9474, 9 Fed.
Reg. 10,815 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9476, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,817 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9478, 9
Fed. Reg. 11,045 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9481, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,387 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9482,
9 Fed. Reg. 11,459 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9483, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,601 (1944); Exec. Order No.
9484, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,731 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9536, 10 Fed. Reg. 3939 (1945).
48 See Exec. Order No. 9462, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,071 (1944) (seizing several motor carriers).
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railroads," textiles,50 and food processing.m Often these orders intoned
the President's moral authority as national leader. 52
Two orders gave indications that employer hiring of striker re-
placements prolonged disputes and impeded prosecution of the war.
Executive Order 8928's fact-finding in a dispute involving Air Associ-
ates found:
[A] controversy arose concerning the terms and conditions
of employment between said company and its workers which
they have been unable to adjust by collective bargaining and
the controversy was duly certified to the National Defense
Mediation Board . . . [and] the Board, pending further me-
diation, recommended that the workers call off the strike and
the company return all strikers upon application to their
former jobs without discrimination . . . [and] the workers
affected . . . have accepted but the company has failed to
carry out the Board's recommendation . . . . 59
The President then directed the Secretary of War to take possession
of the affected airplane parts facility, and to hire employees as
necessary, including "a competent civilian advisor on industrial re-
lations."54 Executive Order 8773 implicitly indicated a striker-re-
placement controversy at North American Aviation's Inglewood plant
49 See Exec. Order No. 9108, 7 Fed. Reg. 2201 (1943) (seizing the Toledo; Peoria & Western
Railroad Co.); Exec. Order No. 9341, 8 Fed. Reg. 6323 (1943) (seizing the American Railroad
Co. of Puerto Rico); Exec. Order No. 9412, 8 Fed. Reg. 17,395 (1943) (authorizing seizure of all
railroads threatened by a December 30 strike); Exe .c. Order No. 9516, 10 Fed. Reg. 1313 (1945)
(seizing the Bingham & Garfield Railroad Co.).
5° See Exec. Order No. 9420, 9 Fed. Reg. 1563 (1944) (seizing Arkwright Corp., Berkshire
Fine Spinning, Bourne Mills, Howard Arthur Mills, Richard Borden Mfg., and Sagamore Mfg.).
51 See Exec. Order No. 9505, 9 Fed. Reg. 14,478 (1944) (seizing Cudahy Bros. meat processing
plants).
52 See Exec. Order No. 8773, 6 Fed. Reg. 2777 (1941). The policy preamble premised a plant
seizure in these terms:
Whereas on the 27th day of May, 1941, a Presidential proclamation was issued,
declaring an unlimited national emergency and calling upon all loyal citizens in
production for defense to give precedence to the needs of the Nation to the end
that a system of government which makes private enterprise possible may survive;
and calling upon our loyal workmen as well as employers to merge their lesser
differences in the larger effort to insure the survival of the only kind of government
which recognizes the rights of labor or of capital.
Id.
53 Exec. Order No. 8928, 6 Fed. Reg. 5559 (1941). Background for the dispute appears in
DEFENSE, MEDIATION BOARD REPORT, supra note 32, at 127; and Air Associates, Inc., 20 N.L.R.B.
356, 359 (1940).
54 Exec. Order No. 8928, § 6, 6 Fed. Reg. 5559 (1941).
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when it found that a strike was occurring, 55 ordered the Secretary
of War to make arrangements to employ workers, 56 and concluded
by directing him "to take such measures as may be necessary to
protect workers returning to the plant.""
Apart from establishing a super-board to resolve labor-management
disputes and seizing and operating numerous workplaces, Roosevelt's
orders effectively displaced several statutory schemes for regulating
private employment. Citing no statutory authority, Executive Order
9301 established a minimum wartime workweek of forty-eight hours. 58
It aimed to maximize use of the nation's scarce human resources i9 by
ordering that "[1] or the duration of the war, no plant, factory, or other
place of employment shall be deemed to be making the most effective
utilization of its manpower if the minimum workweek therein is less
than 48 hours per week."69
Enforcement was left ambiguously in the hands of the Chairman
of the War Manpower Commission, who was authorized to make ap-
propriate regulations to enforce the order. 6' The order did not contra-
dict the Fair Labor Standards Act, which implicitly prescribed a forty-
hour work week by attaching a penalty to employers working employees
over this number; 62 but it forced employers to arrange work schedules
so that payment of time-and-a-half wages would occur every week. In
a similar vein, Executive Order 9290 virtually required federal contrac-
tors working on public works projects to employ their workers more
than eight hours a day. 65
Roosevelt offset the labor cost of these orders by reducing em-
ployer payments for premium-time work. Executive Order 9240 was
based on an understanding that many unions had been successful in
negotiating premium pay for workers, typically double-time pay for
weekend and holiday work." Blending a heavy hand with a unifying
55 Exec. Order No. 8773, § 3, 6 Fed. Reg. 2777 (1941).
56 Id. § 6.
57 Id.
58 See Exec. Order No. 9301, 8 Fed. Reg. 1825 (1943).
59 See id. (policy preamble premising the order on the need "to meet the manpower require-
ments of our armed forces and our expanding war production program by a fuller utilization of
our available manpower").
60 Id. § 1.
61 Id. § 3.
62 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1) (1994) (prohibiting employment more than 40 hours in a week
that is not compensated at less than time-and-a-half the hourly wage rate).
° Exec. Order No. 9290, 7 Fed. Reg. 11,051 (1942) (suspending the Eight-Hour Workday
law). Notably, Congress in 1892 provided the President authority to suspend this law upon the
existence of an extraordinary emergency, Id.
54
 Exec. Order No. 9240, 7 Fed. Reg. 7159 (1942),
242	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 37;229
appeal to workers, the order began by observing that "many labor
organizations have already adopted the patriotic policy of waiving
double time wage compensation or other premium pay for work on
Saturday, Sunday and holidays . . . for the duration of the war." 65
Finding it "desirable and necessary in the prosecution of the war,
and to insure uniformity and fair treatment for those labor organiza-
tions, employers, and employees who are conforming to such wage
policies that this principle be universally adopted," 66 the order prohib-
ited such premium pay for the duration of the war, except for anyone
working a seventh consecutive day in a regularly scheduled workweek."
The law left intact the statutory requirement to pay daily or weekly
overtime," and carved an exemption allowing premium pay for certain
holidays." The net effect of the order was to turn back premium pay
provisions negotiated by unions in collective bargaining agreements
reached under the NLRA or the Railway Labor Act ("RLA").
In addition to these notable labor market intrusions, a series of
executive orders provided strict government regulation of wages and
salaries, along with prices. Unlike many of Roosevelt's orders, Execu-
tive Order 9250 was issued pursuant to express statutory authority. 70
The order created an Economic Stabilization Board, including the
Secretary of Labor and Chairman of the National War Labor Board,
and empowered it to adopt policies to control prices, rents, wages,
salaries, profits, rationing subsidies, and all related matters. 7 '
Title II of the order applied specifically to wage and salary controls
and expressly prohibited any change in pay without approval by the
National War Labor Board. 72
 Although this policy subjected wage ne-
gotiations, a primary focus of collective bargaining, to government
veto, it expressly reaffirmed an earlier policy of encouraging free
collective bargaining."
Although Executive Order 9250 set a general policy of no pay
raises, it left room for the War Labor Board to grant exceptions. This
leeway, however, proved to be too much. Finding that this exception
w Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. §1.A(1).
68 Id. § I.A(2).
69
 Exec. Order No. 9240, §1.13, 7 Fed. Reg. 7159 (1942) (exempting work performed on New
Year's Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas and Memorial Day).
79
 Exec. Order No. 9250, 7 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1942) (policy preamble citing passage of an Act
to Amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942).
71
 Id. at tit. I, §§ 2-3 and tit. 111, § 2.
72 Id. at tit. II, §§ 1-3.
73 Id. at tit. 11 , § 8 (reaffirming this policy as found in Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237
(1942)).
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undermined economic stabilization, 74 Executive Order 9328 further
narrowed the grounds for the Board to approve any pay raise: 16 In a
remarkable extension of federal authority, it essentially prevented workers
from changing jobs in order to get a pay raise.76 In Executive Order
9370, the President further coordinated decision making by requiring
the Chairman of the War Labor Board to report cases of noncompli-
ance to the Director of Economic Stabilization." The order expanded
enforcement powers to include withholding benefits and privileges
from noncomplying employers, 78 and holding compulsory union dues
in escrow until compliance was achieved. 79 Anyone accepting a non-
conforming pay raise was subject to cancellation of draft deferment or
loss of employment privileges."
The urgency that helped the nation put aside its divisions quickly
subsided by the end of the war. Unions, upon whom the nation's war
effort vitally depended, launched a strike wave. 8 ' Like Roosevelt's presi-
dency, Harry Truman's involved many actions taken as Commander in
Chief: ending World War II, rebuilding Europe while containing com-
munism, and waging war in Korea. As a result, he issued numerous
orders affecting collective bargaining, such as reorganizing the War
Labor Board," continuing wage and price controls," partially suspend-
74 Exec. Order No. 9328, 8 Fed. Reg. 4681 (1943).
76 1d. § 2 (authorizing the Board to grant wage increases only if they "are clearly necessary
to correct substandards of living"). This section exempted the ceiling on raises for promotions,
job reclassifications, merit increases, and incentive pay systems. Id.
76 Id. § 3. This section stated;
The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission is authorized to forbid the
employment by any employer of any new employee or the acceptance of employ-
ment by a new employee except as authorized in accordance with regulations which
may be issued . . . for the purpose of preventing such employment at a wage or
salary higher than that received by such new employee in his last employment
unless the change in employment would aid in the effective prosecution of the war.
Id.
77 Exec. Order No. 9370, 8 Fed. Reg. 11,463 (1943).
78 Id. § (a).
79 Id. § (b).
"0 Id. § (c).
81 Partly because of this activity, a Republican Congress was elected in 1946 and passed
sweeping legislation to curb worker rights under the NLRA. This history is reflected in Sen. Taft's
speech explaining public sentiment as the Taft-Hartley Act was being debated;
They had been deluged with a series of strikes. They had been deluged with strikes
ordered for men who did not desire the strikes. They had been deluged with strikes
against companies which had settled all difference with their own men. They had
been deluged with strikes in violation of existing collective bargaining agreements
... [t]here was a demand that we act.
93 CONG. REC. 7536 (daily ed. June 23, 1947) (statement of Sen. Taft).
82 See Exec. Order No. 9672, 11 Fed. Reg. 221 (1945) (abolishing the National War Labor
Board and reconstituting its functions under the National Wage Stabilization Board).
83 See Exec. Order No. 9697, 11 Fed. Reg. 1691 (1946).
244
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 37:229
ing the Eight-Hour Law," and seizing and operating workplaces af-
fected by labor disturbances. Numerous seizures affected basic manu-
facturing," textile mills, 86 slaughterhouses," coal mines, 88 refineries,"
railroads,90 tugboat operations,91 motor carriers, 92
 and bus lines" vari-
ously affected by threatened or actual strikes.
Truman's orders had no conceptual novelty, but sparked more
controversy than Roosevelt's. This was partly due to Roosevelt's colossal
stature as a national leader and Americans' more tenuous acceptance
of Truman in the same role.94 More important, the end of World War II
changed social and economic expectations and, implicitly, the Ameri-
can public's tolerance for ambitious executive orders. Unions grew
84 See Exec. Order No. 9898, 12 Fed. Reg. 6781 (1947).
85 See Exec. Order No. 9542, 10 Fed. Reg. 4591 (1945) (seizing United Engineering Co.);
Exec. Order No. 9552, 10 Fed. Reg. 5757 (1945) (seizing Cocker Machine & Foundry Co.); Exec.
Order No. 9559, 10 Fed. Reg. 6287 (1945) (seizing Gaffney Mfg. Co.); Exec. Order No. 9574, 10
Fed. Reg. 7435 (June 18, 1945) (seizing Diamond Alkali Co.); Exec. Order No. 9585, 10 Fed. Reg.
8335 (1945) (seizing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.); Exec. Order No. 9592A, 10 Fed. Reg. 9703
(1945) (seizing the Los Angeles Shipbuilding and DryDock Corp.); Exec. Order No. 9593, 10
Fed. Reg. 9379 (1945) (seizing Springfield Plywood Corp.); Exec. Order No. 9595, 10 Fed. Reg.
9571 (1945) (seizing United States Rubber Co.); Exec. Order No. 9473, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,613 (1944)
(seizing International Nickel Co.); Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952) (seizing
numerous steel mills and plants).
86 See Exec. Order No. 9560, 10 Fed. Reg. 6547 (1945) (seizing Mary-Leila Cotton Mills, Inc.).
81 See Exec. Order No. 9685, 11 Fed, Reg. 989 (1946) (seizing numerous meat processing
plants).
88 See Exec. Order No. 9548, 10 Fed. Reg. 5025 (1945) (seizing various coal mines); Exec.
Order No. 9758, 11 Fed, Reg. 7927 (1946) (same); Exec. Order No. 9728, 11 Fed. Reg. 5593
(1946) (same).
" See Exec. Order No. 9540, 10 Fed. Reg. 4193 (1945) (seizing Cities Service Refining Corp.);
Exec. Order No. 9564, 10 Fed. Reg. 6791 (1945) (seizing Humble Oil & Refining Co.); Exec.
Order No. 9565, 10 Fed. Reg. 6792 (1945) (seizing Cabin Creek Oil Field of Pure Oil Co.); Exec.
Order No. 9577A, 10 Fed. Reg. 8091 (1945) (seizing Texas Co.).
9(1
 Exec. Order No. 9572, 10 Fed. Reg. 7315 (1945) (seizing Toledo, Peoria & Western
Railroad); Exec. Order No. 9602, 10 Fed. Reg. 10,960 (1945) (seizing the Illinois Central Railroad
Co.); Exec. Order No. 9727, 11 Fed. Reg. 5461 (1946) (seizing numerous railroads); Exec. Order
No. 9736, 11 Fed. Reg. 6661 (1946) (seizing the Monongahela Connecting Railroad Co.); Exec.
Order No. 9957, 13 Fed. Reg. 2503 (1948) (seizing numerous railroads); Exec. Order No. 10,155,
15 Fed. Reg. 5785 (1950) (seizing numerous railroads throughout the nation); Exec. Order No.
10,141, 15 Fed. Reg. 4363 (1950) (seizing Chicago, Rock Island & Western Railroad Co.).
91 See Exec. Order No. 9693, 11 Fed. Reg. 1421 (1946) (seizing numerous boat towing
companies).
82 See Exec. Order No. 9554, 10 Fed. Reg. 5981 (1945) (seizing several motor carriers).
83 See Exec. Order No. 9570, 10 Fed. Reg. 7235 (1945) (seizing the Scranton Transit Co.).
94
 This is reflected in Truman's underdog status as an incumbent president in the 1946
contest with Governor Thomas Dewey. A Truman biography presents this succinctly: "The domi-
nating strategy of the Dewey campaign, to say as little as possible, was Dewey's own-'When you're
leading, don't talk,' he would tell the Republican politicians who came aboard his train." DAvto
MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 672 (1992). Truman, in contrast, had to wage a now infamous "Give-'em-
hell-Harry" campaign that most observers thought was doomed. Id. at 683.
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more restive and no longer tried to accommodate industry for the
greater good of the nation."
The national coal strikes of 1946 typified the unraveling of the
social contract that Roosevelt had knit between labor and management
in Executive Order 8773." In Executive Order 9728 Truman seized
struck mines and then entered into a new collective bargaining agree-
ment with the United Mine Workers. 97 Several months later, Mine
Workers president John L. Lewis demanded new negotiations to mod-
ify this agreement; but when the government administrator denied
this, the Mine Workers declared the contract terminated and walked
off their jobs." With winter approaching, this triggered a national
crisis. Truman was successful in enjoining the strike, 99 but the Mine
Workers defied this order.'" Lewis and his union were then tried on
contempt charges and were respectively fined $10,000 and $3.5 mil-
lion."
But no executive order was more controversial than Executive
Order 10,340, directing a nationwide seizure of steel mills and plants.
Members of the steelworkers union, in the midst of the Korean War,
stayed on their jobs months after their labor agreements had expired;
but their patience was exhausted by April 1952, when they announced
their intention to engage in a nationwide strike.' 92
85
 See Benjamin Aaron, Amending the 'Taft-Hartley Act: A Decade of Frustration, 11 Irmus, &
LAB. REL. REV. 327, 330 (1958).
88 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Executive Order 8773.
97 See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 263 n.1 (1947).
58 See id. at 264-67.
85 See id. at 266. The injunction was issued immediately and without notice to the union. Id.
It barred termination of the agreement, breaching of any obligation tinder it, and striking. Id.
at 266 n.12.
lw See id. at 267.
14) I Id. at 269. The Supreme Court upheld Lewis's criminal contempt fine but substantially
modified the union's fine. See id. at 304-05,
tut David McCullough offers this brief summary:
A steel crisis had been a long time coming. Driven by the demands of the war, the
mills were producing record tonnage. Profits, too, were on the rise. Yet steel
workers, unlike workers in auto and electrical industries, had had no pay raise since
1950. In November 1951, the 650,000 United Steel Workers ... called for a boost
in wages of 35 cents an hour. Management refused to negotiate. The union gave
notice that it would strike when its contract expired on December 31. On December
22, Truman referred the dispute to his Wage Stabilization Board, and to maintain
production, the union agreed to postpone the strike until April 8. When, after weeks
of hearings, the Wage Stabilization Board recommended an hourly raise of 26 cents,
and the union quickly agreed, the companies denounced the proposal as unrea-
sonable, unless they could add a hefty increase of $12 a ton to the price of steel.
Negotiations continued, only to end in deadlock.... To Truman, the pay increase
proposed by the Wage Stabilization Board seemed both 'fair and reasonable,' and
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Citing a series of national security interests,' 03 Truman's order
directed the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate specified
steel mills and operations)" Steel companies were successful in enjoin-
ing this order, and on June 2, 1945, the United States Supreme Court
ruled the order unconstitutional in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Go. v.
Sawyer.m5 As a result, steelworkers went on a nationwide strike that
began June 2 and ended only after Truman demanded a settlement in
personal negotiations with the national union president and president
of U.S. Steel)°6
More than two decades later, in response to construction costs
escalating at a greater rate than for the rest of the economy, President
Richard Nixon issued Executive Order 11,588) 07 The order was un-
usual because it was based on enabling legislation 1 °8 and was limited to
one industry, construction.wg It preempted unions from negotiating
the most direct way to prevent a strike that would not only be a national emergency
but would critically impair the flow of munitions to Korea and to the buildup of
NATO forces in Europe, which he saw as crucial.
McCtmLoucu, supra note 94, at 897.
I" Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952). The policy preamble stated:
[T]he existence of a national emergency which requires that the military .. .
defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible. . . [because]
American fighting men . arc now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of
aggression in Korea, and forces of the United States are stationed elsewhere over-
seas for the purpose of participating in the defense of the Atlantic Community
against aggression ... [and] weapons ... needed by our armed forces . . . are
produced to a great extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component
. [and] a controversy has arisen between certain companies in the United States
producing and fabricating steel ... and certain of their workers represented by the
United Steel Workers of America . regarding terms and conditions of employ-
ment . . . [and] the controversy has not been settled through the processes of
collective bargaining or through the efforts of the Government ... and a strike has
been called for 12:01 A.M., April 9, 1952. .
Id.
104 See id. § I. Section 3 authorized the Secretary to "determine and prescribe terms and
conditions of employment under which the plants, facilities, and other properties . . . shall be
operated." Id. § S.
105 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
1 °6 See McCuu.ouGH, supra note 94, at 901-03.
1 °7 Exec. Order No. 11,588, 36 Fed. Reg. 6339 (1971) (finding that "wages and prices in the
construction industry have tended in recent years to increase at a rate greater than that for the
economy as a whole").
1 °8 See id. (policy preamble citing the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379,
84 Stat. 799, 799-800 (1970)).
1 °11 See id. The Davis-Bacon Act, as amended, requires contractors holding public works
contracts in excess of $2000 to pay prevailing area wages and benefits. 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1994).
These rates result from regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor that approximate craft union
pay and benefit scales. See 29 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1995). This regulation reduces nonunion contractors'
competitive edge by nullifying their cost-savings advantage over contractors already paying their
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wages and benefits without direct government intervention.' 1 " A tripar-
tite committee was created, consisting of labor, management, and
government officials,"' both to review labor agreements in the con-
struction industry" 2
 and to mobilize public opinion against noncon-
forming agreements." 3
Later in 1971, Nixon expanded this order by imposing general
wage and price controls." 4
 This massive economic intervention was
premised on the belief that inflation control was needed "to improve
our competitive position in world trade and to protect the purchasing
power of the dollar."" 6
 To accomplish this, it froze wages and salaries
for ninety days" 6
 and authorized a presidential council to order em-
workers at union rates. To the extent that collective bargaining agreements in the construction
industry raise these rates above the cost-of-living index, public projects under the Davis-Bacon
Act tend to increase inflation in the economy by increasing workers' purchasing power and
accelerating demand for goods and services they purchase.
Executive Order 11,568 refers to the suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act in its policy preamble
and further states:
Whereas, the national leaders of labor and management in the construction indus-
try have indicated, since the suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act, that under such an
order they will participate with the Government in fair measures to achieve greater
wage and price stability; but are unable to agree on any voluntary arrangement ...
[a] Construction Industry Stabilization Committee . . . is hereby established to
assure generally conformance of any increase in any wage or salary in the construc-
tion industry to the provisions of this order,
Exec. Order No. 11,588, 36 Fed. Reg. 6339, at policy preamble 411 5 & § 1(a) (1971).
"'Industrial relations scholars have repeatedly made this fundamental observation. E.g.,
GEORGE W. TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OP INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 3-4 (1948) ("The
National Labor Relations Act was built up on two main premises: (1) the government should
assist employees to organize unions as a means of assuring them 'equality of bargaining power';
and (2) except for conciliation activities, no further industrial-relations responsibility or function
should be assumed by the governtnent."); see also 79 CONG. REG. 7660 (daily ed. May 16, 1935)
(Sen. Walsh's statement during consideration of the Wagner Act, 1411 the bill proposes to do is
to escort [employee representatives] to the door of their employer .... What happens behind
those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.").
ill Exec. Order No. 11,588, § I (b), 36 Fed. Reg. 6339 (1971).
" 2 Id. § 3(a) (directing the committee "to promptly examine every collective bargaining
agreement negotiated on or after the date of this order ... to determine, in accordance with the
criteria established in section 6, whether wage and salary increases in the agreement are accept-
able and may thus be approved").
115 See id. § 4 (empowering the committee to exercise jurisdiction over nonconforming
agreements); id. § 5(c) (authorizing the committee to publish their determinations by "specifying
the craft and area affected and the wages or salaries deemed unacceptable").
114
 Exec, Order No. 11,615, §§ 1-2, 36 Fed. Reg, 15,727 (1971),
115 Id. at policy preamble (citing the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379,
84 Stat. 799, 799-800 (1970)).
1's Exec. Order No. 11,615, § I (a), 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 (1971) (ordering "wages, and salaries
. ]to] be stabilized for a period of 90 days ... at levels not greater than the highest of those
pertaining to a substantial volume of actual transactions by each individual, business, [or] firm
... during the 30-day period ending August 14, 1971, for like ... services"), If no transactions
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ployers to maintain, and make available, wage records.'" In a rare
departure from presidential orders affecting private employment, Ex-
ecutive Order 11,615 specified criminal punishment." 8 This order was
continued after ninety days by a succession of other orders."'
Although his presidency was short, President Gerald Ford issued
two executive orders affecting private employment. Executive Order
11,849 120
 was minor in scale, objectives, and in its use of federal power.
It established a joint labor-management committee in the construction
industry with modest government involvement."' Its primary purpose
was to encourage peaceful settlement of construction labor disputes.' 22
Though modest compared to others, the order was not trivial. A
riotous attack by union members against a large nonunion construc-
tion project illustrates the value of peaceful settlement of labor disputes
in this setting.' 23 Also, because some construction contracts involve
billions of dollars, and are expressly let to unionized contractors, 124
labor peace resulting from this order may spare costly overruns and
lead to continued preferences for participating employers and unions.
President jimmy Carter's Executive Order 12,092 resembled Nixon's
order to restrain sharply rising inflation. 128 Citing the need "to encour-
age noninflationary pay and price behavior by private industry and
occurred in that benchmark period, employers were directed to use the nearest preceding 30-day
period in which wage or salary transactions occurred. Id.
1 " Id. § 5.
11 " id. § 7 (providing for a maximum criminal fine of $5000 for each nonconforming trans-
action).
119 See Exec. Order No. 11,627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20,139 (1971) (creating a Pay Board composed
of five representatives respectively of organized labor, business, and the general public); Exec.
Order No. 11,640, 37 Fed. Reg. 1213 (1972); Exec. Order No. 11,660, 37 Fed. Reg. 6175 (1972);
Exec. Order No. 11,695, 38 Fed. Reg. 1473 (1973); Exec. Order No, 11,723, 38 Fed. Reg. 15,437
(1973) ("During Phase 111, labor and management have contributed to our stabilization efforts
through responsible collective bargaining ... [but] [p]rice behavior under Phase III has not
been satisfactory."). The wage and price controls were terminated by Exec. Order No. 11,781, 39
Fed. Reg. 15,749 (1974) and Exec. Order No. 11,788, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,113 (1974).
120 Exec. Order No. 11,849, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,887 (1975).
121 See id. §I (creating the Collective Bargaining Committee, consisting of 10 labor and 10
management members, the Secretary of Labor or a designee, and the Director of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service).
12'2 See id. § 2(a) (directing the committee to "facilitate the collective bargaining process at
the local and area levels . .. encourage peaceful negotiation of responsible local and area
agreements, facilitate local coordinated bargaining . . . and seek to resolve particular disputes
that cannot otherwise be reasonably resolved").
122 See BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 23 F.3d 1459, 1460 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
721 (1995).
124 Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 U.S.
218 (1993).
15 See. Exec. Order No. 12,092, 43 Fed. Reg. 51,375 (1978).
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labor, "126 this order prohibited contractors from raising prices and
wages beyond prescribed "noninflationary" limits. 127 Unions challenged
it, fearing that it would prevent them from negotiating wage increases
to keep up with rising inflation.' 28
No president had more transparent election motives in issuing
executive orders than George Bush. In 1988, the United States Su-
preme Court ruled in Communications Workers v. Beck that unions may
compel payment of agency-fee dues only to cover costs of collective
bargaining, contract administration, and adjustment of grievances.' 2"
This meant that no one could be compelled to pay dues to finance a
union's political and lobbying expenses. Some congressmen complained
that workers seeking to assert their Beck rights were being unduly
delayed in NLRB proceedings.' 3°
Six months before the 1992 presidential election, Bush issued
Executive Order 12,800, 12 ' intended to improve employee efforts to be
free from paying for the political activities of unions representing
them.' 32 Citing the need "to promote harmonious relations in the
workplace for purposes of ensuring the economical and efficient ad-
ministration and completion of Government contracts," the order
directed all federal contractors, subcontractors, and vendors to notify
employees represented by unions of their Beck rights.'" Upon failing
126 1d.
127 See id. § 1-102(b) (defining "noninflationary pay behavior . . . [as] the holding of pay
increases to not more than 7 percent annually above their recent historical levels"). The Chair-
man of the Council on Wage and Price Stability was directed to linionitor company pay and
price practices in order to determine compliance with . . . this Order." Id. § 1-101(a). The
Chairman was then to "[p]ublish . . . the names of individuals or companies which are not in
compliance with the standards" and to "take such ... action as may be necessary and consistent
with the purposes of this Section." Id. § 1-101(c), (d).
I 2R See AFL-C10 v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979); see
also infra notes 247-58 and accompanying text (discussing Kahn and comparing its underlying
facts with those of Executive Order 12, 954),
129 Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988).
130 President Signs Executive Order Requiring Federal Contractors to Post Beck Rights, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A-10, A-11 (Apr. 14, 1992) [hereinafter Beck Rights Executive Order]
(reporting Rep. Torn DeLay's (R., Tex.) contention that the "NLRB wasn't getting cases heard
and taken care of').
131
 Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992).
132 See White House Fact Sheet on Actions to Enforce Beck v. Communications Workers of
America, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at E-1 (Apr. 14, 1992) (equating President Bush's March
20, 1992, statement, "[n]o worker should be forced to have money taken out of his paycheck to
fund politicians he or she disagrees with," with President Thomas Jefferson's 1779 statement,
"[t]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical").
I" Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992).
134 Id. § 2(a) (1). Section 2(a) (1) requires:
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to provide adequate notice, a contractor or vendor would be subject
to debarment.'"
This order was overtly political.'" If promptly implemented, it
would have resulted in a small number of employees starting a proce-
dure that would deny the use of union dues for campaign expendi-
tures. Because unions opposed Bush's reelection,'" the order would
benefit the President by diminishing union campaign funds. Its sym-
bolism was probably more important, signalling Bush's distaste for
unions'" and rallying employers to his candidacy.'" Also, the order was
not based on any research showing that compulsory union dues ad-
versely affected economical administration of government contracts.
The timing of Executive Order 12,818, issued just days before the
1992 presidential elections, underscored Bush's political use of this
presidential power.' 4° Citing numerous policy justifications,' 4' the order
During the term of this contract, the contractor agrees to post a notice, of such
size and in such form as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, in conspicuous places
in and about its plants and offices, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. The notice shall include the following information . . . :
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Under Federal law, employees cannot be required to join a union or maintain
membership in a union in order to retain their jobs. Under certain conditions, the
law permits a union and an employer to enter into a union-security agreement
requiring employees to pay uniform periodic dues and initiation fees. However,
employees who are not union members can object to the use of their payments for
certain purposes and can only be required to pay their share of union costs relating
to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment_
If you believe that you have been required to pay dues or fees used in part to
support activities not related to collective bargaining, contract administration, or
grievance adjustment, you may be entitled to a refund and to an appropriate
reduction hi future payments.
For further information concerning your rights, you may wish to contact [the
NLRB, with address given].
Id.
155 1d. § 3 -
156 See Beck Rights Executive Order, supra note 130, at A-10, A-II (reporting the President's
press secretary's denial that this order was politically motivated). When asked why Bush waited
three years after Beck to implement this order, Marlin Fitzwater replied that the president had
hoped the NLRB would have addressed this issue sooner.
I" Kirkland Says Bush Order Implementing Beck Will Not Affect Union Political Activity, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A-13 (Apr. 14, 1992) (reporting that the AFL-CIO officially declared
its support for then primary-candidate Bill Clinton the same day Bush issued Executive Order
12,800).
13/4 See Beck Rights Executive Order, supra note 130, at A-10 (reporting Bush's statement that
'Mull implementation of this principle will guarantee that no American will have his job or
livelihood threatened for refusing to contribute to political activities against his wilt").
1 " Id. at A-12 (reporting that the National Right-to-Work Committee, an antiunion group
that pressed Beck's case before the Supreme Court and was later critical of the NLRB's slow
processing of Beck complaints, was very supportive of this order).
149
 Exec. Order No. 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,713 (1992).
141
 See id. The order stated that the directive was needed
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conditioned awarding of government construction projects on open
bidding to nonunion as well as union contractors. 142 In spite of its plain
campaign appeal, the order accurately reflected the fact that nonunion
contractors had been shut out of bidding on huge federally funded
construction projects.' 43 The order increased enforcement of the NLRA's
prohibition against closed shops' 44 by adding the penalty of contract
debarment for any contractor violating this provision, 14' and therefore
was warmly greeted by the president of the Associated Builders and
Contractors, a group representing nonunion contractors. 146
B. Executive Orders Prohibiting Employment Discrimination
Nazi ideology regarding Aryans as a master race and Jews as
subhuman posed an ironic problem for American armed forces be-
cause they were racially segregated.' 47 As the war deepened, its de-
mands on the economy stretched the labor force so thin"' that racial
in order to (1) promote and ensure open bidding on Federal and federally funded
construction projects; (2) increase competition in Federal construction contracts
and contracts under Federal grants or cooperative agreements; (3) reduce construc-
tion costs; (4) expand job opportunities, especially for small businesses; and (5)
uphold the associational rights of workers freely to select, or refrain from selecting,
bargaining representatives and to decide whether or not to be union members ....
Id.
142 See id. § 1(a) (requiring that before awarding any construction contract, an executive
agency must "ensure that neither the agency's bid specifications, project agreements, nor other
controlling documents ... [acquire bidders ... to enter into or adhere to agreements with one
or more labor organizations").
143 Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 U.S.
218, 219 (1994).
344 As a result, NLRA § 8(b) (2) makes it an unfitir labor practice for a union "to cause or
attempt to cause an employer . to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on sonic ground other than
his failure to tender ... periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership." '29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1994).
145 See Exec. Order No. 12,818, § 3(a), 57 Fed. Reg. 48,713 (1992).
146 In the midst of the election, the president of the Associated Builders and Contractors,
Steven D. %result, noted: "President Bush, by his action, has delivered a strong message to our
association and all open shop contractors of his desire to provide an environment in which open
shop contractors can work free of discrimination and provide the public with the quality, cost-ef-
fective construction they deserve." President Issues Executive Order to Require "Open Bidding" on
Contracts, Daily Lab, Rep. (BNA) No. 207, at A-13, A-I4 (Oct. 26, 1992).
147 See ALBERT R. BUCHANAN, BLACK AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II 84-88, 98-99 (1977);
RICHARD M. DALFRIME, DE-SEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: FIGHTING ON Two FRONTS,
1939-1953 (1969); NEIL A. WYNN, THE AFRO-AMERICAN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 24 (1976).
' 45 The national unemployment rate fell sharply, from 17.2% in 1939, 14.6% in 1940, 10.0%
in 1941, and 4.7% in 1942, to 1.9% in 1943 and 0.1% in 1944. See BUREAU or L..A Boit STATISTICS,
U.S. DEFT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK 01? LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. No. 916, ail. A-I2 (1947), The
Bureau of Labor Statistics did not calculate unemployment rates during this period; however, it
reported the estimated number of unemployed people and estimated number of people in the
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employment practices imposed harmful barriers to effective utilization
of workers. This background helps to explain why President Franklin
Roosevelt ordered federal contractors to end discriminatory practices. 14°
Race segregation in this period has been well documented.' 5°
Contemporaneous court decisions reflect the official nature of this
discrimination: Brown v. Mississippi'm threw out an African American's
confession arrived at by a sheriff deputy's severe whipping; University
of Maryland v. Murraym struck down a race restriction for admission
to the University of Maryland's law school; Lane v. Wilson' 53 invalidated
an Oklahoma law granting African Americans only a twelve-day period
for registering to vote; and Smith v. Allright' 54
 ruled that exclusively
white primaries resulting from political party rules were unconstitu-
tional.
Writing in this period, the eminent sociologist Gunnar Myrdal
remarked: "Segregation is now becoming so complete that the white
Southerner practically never sees a Negro except as his servant and in
other standardized and formalized caste situations."'" In addition, an
African American novelist, George W. Lee, wrote a poignant novel
protesting the tenant-farming system as an extension of slavery. 156
 As a
civil rights protest movement planned its biggest march on Washing-
ton, 157
 Roosevelt issued Executive Order $802. 1"
Citing "evidence that available and needed workers have been
barred from employment in industries engaged in defense production
solely because of considerations of race, creed, color, or national ori-
civilian labor force. I computed unemployment rates by dividing the number of unemployed
people by the number of people in the labor force.
149 See Mary McLeod Bethune, My Secret Talks with FDR, in THE NEGRO IN DEPRESSION AND
WAR 53-65 (Bernard Sternsher ed., 1969).
15°E.g„ CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN
TRANSIT (1983); DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969); W.J.
CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW (1974).
151
 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Responding to a question about how hard he beat the defendant,
the deputy replied, "Not too much for a Negro; not as much as I would have done if it were left
to me." Id, at 284.
isz 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
153 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
154 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
155 MYRDAL, supra note 150, at 41.
156 GEORGE W. LEE, RIVER GEORGE (1937).
157 Shortly before the order was issued, the NAACP approved A. Philip Randolph's plan to
organize 100,000 African Americans in a march on Washington, D.C. The goal of the march was
to open jobs to these Americans in defense-industry plants. PETER M. BERGMAN, THE CHRONO-
LOGICAL HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 493 (1969).
158 Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
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gin, to the detriment of workers' morale and of national unity," 159
Roosevelt stated: "I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States
that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in
defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or
national origin . . . ." 16°
The order also applied to unionslfil because of their importance
in creating employment opportunities through hiring halls and closed-
shop agreements, 162 and because of their propensity to discriminate
against African Americans.' 63 it directed government agencies "con-
cerned with vocational and training programs for defense production
. [to] take special measures ... to assure that such programs are
administered without discrimination,"'" and obligated private employ-
ers who were under defense contracts not to discriminate on the basis
of race, creed, color, or national origin.' 65 A simple enforcement pro-
cedure was established with creation of the Committee on Fair Employ-
ment Practice.' 66 The order provided no specific penalty for findings
of noncompliance.
Roosevelt added two related orders during the war. Executive
Order 9001 fleshed out critical details left vague by Roosevelt's initial
order. It mainly dealt with "mak[ing] available for the production of
war material all the industrial resources of the Country." 167 To achieve
this, the President authorized every facility and plant suitable for sup-
porting the war to be put under contract and thereby converted to
public use.' 68 In effect, this meant the government was also leasing the
millions of workers employed by these plants, "and all contracts [were]
deemed to incorporate by reference a provision that the contractor
and any subcontractors . . . [were] not [to] discriminate." 169
 Since the
entire economy was mobilized for war, this effectively placed all private
188 1d. (policy preamble).
16° Id.
161 Id.
162 See HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAVY-HARTLEY
432-33 (1950) (describing closed shops and hiring halls From 1935 to 1947).
"See, e.g„ Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 195, 204 (1944) (holding that a union's
duty of fair representation bars practices that discriminate on the basis of race).
164 Exec. Order No. 8802, § 1, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
165 Id. § 2 (providing that "[a]l1 contracting agencies of the Government
	 shall include in
all defense contracts . . . a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any
worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin").
166 /d. § 3 (providing that the "Committee shall receive and investigate complaints of dis-
crimination in violation of .. this order and shall take appropriate steps to redress grievances
which it finds to be valid").
187
 Exec. Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941) (policy preamble).
168 See H. at tit. I.
168 1d. § 2.
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employers under a duty not to discriminate. Essentially, by the stroke
of his pen in 1943, Roosevelt established a rudimentary affirmative
action policy.
Executive Order 9346 followed with a broader and more detailed
version of Executive Order 8802. It expanded the first order by requir-
ing "(a)ll contracting agencies of the Government of the United States
[to] include in all contracts . . . a provision obligating the contractor
not to discriminate." The nondiscrimination principle was thus ex-
tended beyond the defense industry. Reflecting the Administration's
commitment to this principle, the order reconstituted the Committee
on Fair Employment Practice!" and widened its enforcement powers. 172
Victory in the war brought the new Truman Administration an
employment policy dilemma. Before the United States was drawn into
the war, labor's legislative agenda resulted in passage of a sweeping law
partly designed to prevent African Americans willing to work for lower
wages from competing for many construction jobs. 175
 The Davis-Bacon
Act accomplished this by requiring that wages subsidized on federally
funded public works projects be paid at union scale, euphemistically
called the prevailing wage rate.'" The war appeared to do little to
change some unions' discriminatory practices. 175 Without a compelling
war justification, would Truman continue to promote the progressive
nondiscrimination practices begun under Roosevelt's executive orders?
He did, but his orders had only a maintenance quality. He never-
theless made a critical decision to continue fair employment practices
into "a peacetime economy."175 Executive Order 9664 was deceptively
modest, consisting of a mere thirteen text-lines titled "Continuing the
171) Exec. Order No. 9346, § 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943).
171
 Id. § 6.
172 See id. § 4 (authorizing the Committee to formulate policies to effectuate the order); id.
§ 5 (authorizing the Committee to "receive and investigate complaints of discrimination forbid-
den by this Order . . . [and to] conduct hearings, make findings of fact, and take appropriate
steps to obtain elimination of such discrimination").
173 See Clinton's Bacon Crease, WAI.I. ST. J., Apr. 11, 1995, at A20. An editorial observed:
Davis-Bacon's pedigree runs straight back to Jim Crow. Rep. Robert Bacon of New
York complained that an Alabama contractor had brought in a largely minority
work force to build a federal hospital in his district. He said the neighboring
community was very much upset" and his call to pay "prevailing wages" on all federal
projects was joined by the president of We American Federation of Labor, who
noted that "colored labor is being brought in to demoralize wage rates."
Id.
174 The Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, § 1, 46 Stat, 1494, 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at 40
U.S,C. § 276a(a) (1994)).
175 See, e.g., Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 89-90 (1945) (upholding a New York
law forbidding unions from discriminating on the basis of race, and providing for damages, fines,
and imprisonment).
171 ' Exec. Order No. 9664, 10 Fed. Reg. 15,301 (1945).
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Work of the Fair Employment Practice Committee."'" Its main contri-
bution was assuring continuity of the nondiscrimination principle in
federal contracting.
The Korean War and the rising threat of communism stirred
Truman to shape more specific employment orders. Executive Order
10,210 continued Executive Order 9001's industrial mobilization pol-
icy'Thand contained a provision obligating all contractors and subcontrac-
tors not to discriminate.' 7" But Truman's order differed from Roosevelt's
by lacking a policy preamble voicing a need to create full-employment
opportunities through removal of race discrimination. It contained no
provision for training victims of discrimination. And tellingly, it lacked
any enforcement mechanism. Acknowledging this omission later that
year, Executive Order 10,308 was titled "Improving the Means for
Obtaining Compliance with the Nondiscrimination Provisions of Fed-
eral Contracts," contained the standard prohibition against discrimi-
nation, and created the Committee on Government Contract Compli-
ance.'" By renaming this committee—Roosevelt had named his the
Fair Employment Practice Committee—Truman might have been try-
ing to promote change without generating attention. In fact, however,
the new name seemed to reflect Truman's vague commitment to equal
employment opportunity ("EEO") principles.'"' Executive Order 10,308
insulated contractors from adverse action by toning down the investi-
gatory powers of the committee'" and creating more distance between
the committee and the President.'"
177 Id. (stating that the "Committee shall investigate, make findings and recommendations,
and report to the President, with respect to discrimination in industries engaged in work con-
tributing to the production of military supplies or to the effective transition to a peacetime economy"
(emphasis added)).
°"&c? Exec. Order No. 10,210, § 15, 16 Fed. Reg. 1049 (1951).
179 1d. § 7.
1 "" Exec. Order No. 10,308, § 2, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951).
1111 In this vein, it should be noted that Truman's thinking about race was ambivalent. One
of his biographers found that as a young man, Truman reflected the bigoted attitudes of his
immediate society, expressing contempt for "cran[s]," "nigger[s]," "bohunk[s]," "Dago [sr and
"Chink1s)." McCum.oucia, supra note 94, at 83. Running for office early in his career, and
watching the growing popularity of the Ku Klux Klan, Truman joined that group—but also quit
very soon. Id. at 164-65. But during his presidency, he delivered an impassioned and supportive
speech at a controversial gathering of the NAACP at the Lincoln Memorial, and followed this by
forming an unprecedented civil rights commission. See id. at 570.
' H2 Compareaec. Order No. 10,308, § 3, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951) (authorizing the committee
"to examine and study the rules, procedures, and practices of the contracting agencies") with
Exec, Order No. 9346, § 5, 10 Fed. Reg, 15,301 (1943) (authorizing the committee to "receive
and investigate complaints of discrimination forbidden by this Order" and permitting the com-
mittee to "conduct hearings, make lindings of fact, and take appropriate steps to obtain elimina-
tion of such discrimination").
I" Exec. Order No. 10,308, § 3, 16 Fed, Reg. 12,303 (1951) (directing the compliance
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A Republican president not noted for activist government reinvig-
orated the executive order to change employment practices. Perhaps
President Dwight Eisenhower's military experiences sensitized him to
the morale problems caused by racial segregation. 184 His muted ap-
proach to civil rights issues, and more obvious passion for foreign
affairs, may have contributed to his unexpected leadership on civil
rights issues. 195
In Executive Order 10,479, Eisenhower coined the expression
"equal employment opportunity," and this was incorporated in a pro-
gressive "policy of the United States Government to promote equal
employment opportunity for all qualified persons employed or seeking
employment on government contracts because such persons are enti-
tled to fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of employment on
work paid for from public funds." 86
 In contrast to Truman's go-slow
approach, Eisenhower's order found that "existing practices and pro-
cedures of government contracting agencies show that the practices
and procedures relating to compliance with the nondiscrimination
provisions must be revised and strengthened to eliminate discrimina-
tion in all aspects of employment." 187
This order expanded Executive Order 10,308 in several important
respects. Truman's order was a de facto military contractor policy
because the Director of Defense Mobilization served as the final authority
before the President in the compliance process."8 In contrast, Eisen-
hower's compliance system expressly designated roles for the Justice
and Commerce Departments, implying that some contractors would
fall outside the military's enforcement purview. 189 Truman's order in-
committee to "confer and advise" with contracting agencies to "make to the said officers recom-
mendations" for eliminating or preventing objectionable practices). Only "[w]hen deemed nec-
essary by the Committee" was it to "submit any of these recommendations to the Director of
Defense Mobilization, and the Director shall, when he deems it appropriate, forward such
recommendations to the President, accompanied by a statement of his views as to the relationship
thereof to the mobilization effort" Id.
184
 The U.S. military was not desegregated until Truman ordered this, but during World War
II, General Eisenhower integrated several combat units. 2 ROBERT L. BRANYAN & LAWRENCE H.
LARSEN, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION 1953-1961, at 1049 (1971).
181
 His Administration ended desegregation in the District of Columbia and federal govern-
ment, appointed Earl Warren as Chief Justice, argued in favor of school integration in the
landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision, overcame a successful filibuster in 1956 to gain
passage in 1957 of the first voting rights bill since the Reconstruction era, and ordered troops
into Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce a federal court order to desegregate public schools. 2 Id.
at 1049-52.
I88 Exec. Order No. 10,479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953) (policy preamble).
187 1d.
188 See Exec. Order No. 10,308, § 3, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951).
189 Compare id. § 2(a) (naming representatives from "the Department of the Defense, the
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tended to keep all but the most vexing compliance problems out of
the President's sight, while Eisenhower's required the committee to
"make annual or semiannual reports on its progress to the Presi-
dent."'N Eisenhower's order gave the compliance committee a more
proactive role by including a charge to "encourage the furtherance of
an educational program by employer, labor, civic, educational, relig-
ious, and other voluntary non-governmental groups in order to elimi-
nate or reduce the basic causes and costs of discrimination in employ-
ment."191
 Truman's order did not require contracting agencies to report
complaints to the compliance committee, but Eisenhower's order re-
quired le] ach contracting agency [to] report to the Committee the
action taken with respect to all complaints received by the agency,
including those transmitted by the Committee." 192
 To emphasize its
break from the earlier policy, Eisenhower's order expressly revoked
Truman's and abolished its compliance committee.'"
A year later Eisenhower enhanced this order by prohibiting dis-
crimination in particular types of employment practices as a condition
for holding a government contract. Executive Order 10,557 specifically
targeted discrimination in "employment, upgrading, demotion, or trans-
fer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates
of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training,
including apprenticeship." 194
 This policy later served as model lan-
guage when Congress drafted Title VII's prohibited employment prac-
tices.'95
Department of Labor, the Atomic Energy Commission, the General Services Administration, and
the Defense Materials Procurement Agency") with Exec. Order No. 10,479, § 3(a), 18 Fed. Reg.
4899 (1953) (naming the same except for the military procurement office, and adding the
. Departments of Commerce and justice).
' 9° Compare Exec. Order No. 10,479, § 4, 18 Fed. Reg. 4800 (1953) (Committee required to
make annual or semiannual reports on its progress to the President) with Exec. Order No.
10,308, § 3, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951) (reports to be made to the President only when Director
of Defense Mobilization deems it appropriate).
191 Exec. Order No. 10,479, § 6, 18 Fed, Reg. 4800 (1953).
192 Compare Exec. Order No. 10,479, § 5, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953) with Exec. Order No.
10,308, § 3, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951).
193 Exec. Order No. 10,479, § 9, 18 Fed. Reg. 4800 (1953).
Im Exec. Order No. 10,577, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (1954) (policy preamble).
195
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994) (making it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
(2) (a) (2) (1994) (prohibiting any practice to limit, segregate, or classify . . . employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1994) (making it unlawful for a covered
entity, including anyone controlling an apprenticeship program, "to print or publish . , . any
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The order added another innovation by requiring all contractors
"to post hereafter. in conspicuous places, available for employees and
applicants for employment, notices . . . setting forth the provisions of
the non-discrimination clause."'" Though commonplace today, this
EEO notice was undoubtedly controversial in the 1950s because of the
growing tension between the federal government and states concern-
ing desegregation. 197
President John Kennedy's Executive Order 10,925 continued the
progression of presidential regulation of employment discrimination.
Issued twenty years after Executive Order 8802, and no longer having
a direct military justification, it was premised more broadly on the idea
that "discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin is
contrary to the Constitutional principles and policies of the United
States."198
Kennedy transformed Eisenhower's Committee on Government
Contracts into the President's Committee on Equal Employment Op-
portunity,' 99 implying that the President would be personally account-
able for its actions. This committee was strengthened by naming the
Vice President as its chairmanm and delegating it broad powers.291
For the first time, a presidential order used the term "affirmative
action,"202 connoting a duty not only to refrain from prohibited dis-
crimination, but "to promote full equality of employment opportu-
notice or advertisement relating to employment . . . indicating any preference, limitation, spe-
cification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
199 Exec. Order No. 10,577, § 3, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (1954).
197 As a result of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (abolishing separate but equal
doctrine in provision of public education), a federal judge ordered Little Rock, Arkansas schools
to be desegregated, but Governor Orval Faubus resisted, explaining in a telegram to President
Eisenhower: "The question in issue at Little Rock at this moment is not integration vs. segregation.
Peaceful integration has been accomplished for some time in [some Arkansas schools] . It is
impossible to integrate some of our schools at this time without violence." 2 BRANYAN Sc LARSEN,
supra note 184, at 1120-21. In sending federal troops to implement the court order, Eisenhower
replied: "The federal law and orders of a United States district court implementing that law can
not be flouted with impunity by any individual or any mob of extremists." 2 Id. at 1129.
198 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (policy preamble). This preamble
continued with the finding, "it is in the general interest and welfare of the United States to
promote its economy, security, and national defense through the most efficient and effective
utilization of all available manpower" and noted, "compliance with existing non-discrimination
contract provisions reveal an urgent need for expansion and strengthening of efforts to promote
full equality of employment opportunity." Id.
150 See id. (titled "Establishing the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportu-
nity").
") See id. § 102(a).
291 See id. § I05(a)—(e) (providing the committee rule- and procedure-making powers and
authorizing it to consider and act on compliance reports while communicating this information
to the President).
202 See id. § 301(1) (It] he contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are
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nity."2" Enlarging on Eisenhower's order to post this policy in con-
spicuous places, Kennedy's required contractors "in all solicitations or
advertisements . . . [to] state that all qualified applicants will receive
consideration for employment without regard to race."204 This innova-
tion later appeared in Title VII. 2"
The order also required contractors to furnish the committee with
affirmative action reports, and authorized the committee "access to his
books, records, and accounts .. for purposes of investigation to as-
certain compliance with such rules, regulations, and orders.' 7206 Consis-
tent with the new affirmative action concept, contractors and their
subcontractors were required "to file . . . Compliance Reports with the
contracting agency, which will be subject to review by the Commit-
tee."2" The order's reporting requirement of "employment statistics
of the contractor and each subcontractor" 2" was an innovation that
helped to contribute to the complex Title VII issue of proving disparate
impact discrimination by statistical evidence. 2"
The order also strengthened enforcement by authorizing the com-
mittee to investigate employment discrimination complaints, 210 to hold
hearings,2" and to impose the significant penalty of contract debar-
ment.212 In addition, it provided authority to enjoin violations of this
order. 2" Without any legislative authority, Executive Order 10,925 also
authorized the Department of Justice to institute "criminal proceed-
ings . . for the furnishing of false information to any contracting
agency or to the Committee as the case may be. "214
employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race,
creed, color, or national origin" (emphasis added)).
2°3 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (policy preamble).
204 1d. § 301(2) .
205 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1994).
2°6 Exec. Order No. 10,925, § 301(5), 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
207 /d. § 302(a).
2oa Id.
209 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
210 See Exec. Order No. 10,925, § 309(a), 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
211 Id. § 310(a).
212 See id. § 310(6); see also id. § 312(d) (authorizing the committee to "Merminate, or cause
to be terminated, any contract, or any portion or portions thereof, for failure of the contractor
or subcontractor to comply with the nondiscrimination provisions of the contract").
2121d.
 § 312(b) (authorizing the Department of justice to bring appropriate enforcement
proceedings, including seeking an injunction, "where there is a substantial or material violation
or the threat of substantial or material violation of the contractual provisions"). This innovation
was significant because of the extraordinary judicial powers that could be brought to bear on
contractors who failed to comply with the order and because discrimination issues could be
addressed much more promptly.
214 /d. § 312(c),
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This executive order marked a critical turning point in presiden-
tial regulation of private employment. It stated tenets of affirmative
action policy that have become early issues in the 1996 presidential
election, such as statistical comparisons of demographic groups as a
benchmark to measure achievement of EEO goals. 215 By failing to base
its own authority on any legislation, this far-reaching order appeared
to usurp Congress's power to regulate such matters. Instead, it cited
executive orders for authority,216 suggesting that these had become
something like a cumulating body of common law for federal procure-
ment. This boldly asserted power also made false affirmative action
reporting a crime, without citing any enabling or related legislation.
Kennedy widened this regulation in an order pertaining to federally
funded construction. 217 In sum, Kennedy's orders significantly expanded
affirmative action requirements for contractors, and in doing so, added
to the quasi-legislative character of presidential orders affecting private
employment.
President Lyndon Johnson's Executive Order 11,246 218 is com-
monly credited for establishing affirmative action, 219 but his order was
mostly a reprise of Executive Order 10,925. One curious aspect was its
continued prohibition against "race, creed, color, or national origin"
discrimination, because Title VII, enacted a year earlier, contained a
broader prohibition against "race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin."220 Executive Order 11,246's omission of sex discrimination is
interesting since it suggests that this type of bias was then invisible to
policy-makers. Johnson addressed age discrimination 22 ' three years be-
fore addressing sex discrimination in Executive Order 11 ,375. 222 Execu-
tive Order 11,246's most important change was to strengthen enforce-
215 See Zachry, supra note 9 (reporting Gov. Pete Wilson's (R., Cal.) curtailment of state
affirmative action principles in his early bid for the presidency); see also Michael K. Frisby, Clinton
Sees Need for Affirmative Action Plans but May Open Set -Aside Programs to Whites, WALL ST. J., July
14, 1995, at A14.
216 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (policy preamble).
217 Exec. Order No. 11,114, 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963). This order expressly extended Execu-
tive Order 10,925 to "contracts for construction financed with assistance from the Federal Govern-
ment." Id. (policy preamble). The order applied to any contract with funding administered by
any federal agency. Id. § 101. Construction contract was broadly defined to include "any contract
for the construction, rehabilitation, alteration, conversion, extension, or repair of buildings,
highways, or other improvements to real property." Id. § 102(a).
238 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
219 A standard casebook implies this when it discusses only Johnson's orders in an historical
discussion of Title VII and affirmative action. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCI; LIEBMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT LAW 232-33 (1994).
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) to (2) (1994).
221 See Exec. Order No. 11,141, 29 Fed. Reg. 2477 (1964).
222 See Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
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ment by transferring this function to the Secretary of Labor. 223
 Also,
the order extended affirmative action requirements to each contrac-
tor's or subcontractor's vendors. 224
President Gerald Ford's Executive Order 11,914 was more sig-
nificant, prohibiting discrimination with respect to the handicapped
in federally assisted programs. 225
 It applied to all federal agencies ad-
ministering any kind of financial assistance under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 2s That law served as a forerunner to the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 227 an important employment
law. Ford's order directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to identify discriminatory practices under section 504,228 to
issue rules and regulations to prevent such discrimination:228 and to
secure compliance by suspending or terminating, if necessary, federal
financial assistance."' Although not directly litigated, the order was
cited with approval in a section 504 lawsuit alleging employment dis-
crimination."' President Carter revoked this order when he issued a
technical executive order to consolidate enforcement on nondiscrimi-
nation laws under the United States Attorney Genera1. 232
C. Court Challenges to Executive Orders Affecting Private Employment
Direct challenges to executive orders regulating private employ-
ment have been uncommon. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyee"
is the only decision directly overruling an executive order affecting
223 See Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 ( 1965).
224 See id. 202(7) (ordering government contractors to include in their subcontracts or
purchase orders the affirmative action duties stated in this order).
225 See Exec. Order No, 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
226 Id
, § 1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794).
227
 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994).
229 Exec. Order No. 11,914, § 3, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
229
 Id. § 2.
230	 § 3(b) .
231
 Consolidated Rail Corp, v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 (1984) (holding that a decedent's
estate is entitled to recovery of an employment discrimination claim filed under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act). When the discriminatee lost his job as a rail engineer because his left forearm
was amputated, he sued under § 504, alleging he was still capable of performing his job duties.
Id. at 628. His employer, Erie Lackawanna Railroad, was reorganized into Conrail, and federal
funding aided this restructuring. Id. at 627, 628. The Court observed that the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, "the agency designated by the President to be responsible for
coordinating enforcement of § 504 from the outset has interpreted that section to prohibit
employment discrimination by all recipients of federal financial aid, regardless of the primary
objective of that aid." Id. at 634 (citation omitted). That reasoning defeated the employer's
argument that federal aid was not given with a particular employment objective. See id.
232 Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980) (pertaining, inter alia, to § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act (§ 1-201(c)) and expressly revoking Exec. Order No. 11,914 (§ 1-502)).
233 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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private employment, and the Chamber of Commerce's current chal-
lenge to Clinton's striker-replacement order cites this exceptional case
as a precedent.234 Youngstown is relevant to Clinton's order insofar as
it involved an executive order pertaining to private-sector collective
bargaining rights. This discussion shows, however, that the facts in
Youngstown are clearly distinguishable from the facts presented in the
Chamber of Commerce suit.
To avert a nationwide strike by the United Steelworkers, President
Truman issued Executive Order 10,340 directing the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize and operate numerous steel mills.'" Obeying the order
under protest, affected companies successfully sought a preliminary
injunction."8 An appeals court promptly stayed the injunction, 237 and
the Supreme Court took up the matter.
Justice Black's majority opinion strictly construed the President's
constitutional authority to issue a seizure order. He reasoned that "no
statute . . . expressly authorizes the President to take possession of
property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our
attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be
implied."238 He dismissed Truman's argument that the order properly
derived from the President's constitutional role as Commander in
Chief, observing:
Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we
cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ulti-
mate power as such to take possession of private property in
order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This
is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authori-
ties.'"
Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, provided a more flexible
approach for determining the constitutionality of an executive order.
2"4 Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-47. The complaint argues:
In a leading case involving separation of powers, the Supreme Court held that the
President's authority to issue an Executive Order "must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself." The President clearly has no inherent
constitutional authority to condition participation in the federal procurement pro-
gram on the forfeiture of rights protected under federal statutes.
Id. (citation omitted).
2" See supra notes 85, 102-06 for a summary of the order and its implementation.
23tYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D.D.C. 1952), affd, 343
U.S. 937 (1952).
237 Youngstown Sheet 8c Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 197 F.2d 582, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
238 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585.
239 Id. at 587.
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The President's authority is at its fullest when an order is expressly or
impliedly authorized or delegated by Congress, 24° and decreases to its
minimum when used incompatibly with the express or implied will of
Congress. 24 ' This power exists in a zone of twilight when the President
acts in the absence of a congressional grant or denial of authority.
Thus, "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may some-
times . enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. "212
Jackson's analysis is superior to Black's for evaluating the numer-
ous presidential orders affecting private employment. If Black's ap-
proach were applied to all these orders, only a handful pertaining to
production of military goods during an officially declared war could be
sustained. 2" No others could because they went well beyond the express
authority provided in Article 11. 244 On the other hand, Jackson's ap-
proach is more attuned to the realities of presidential power in the
twentieth century because it recognizes that the Constitution not only
"diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable govern-
ment."245 Further, Jackson responded to Black's simplistic notion that
the Constitution requires executive and legislative powers be mutually
exclusive when he observed that the Constitution "enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciproc-
i ty. "246
The executive order challenged in AFL-CIO v. Kahn247 is also
relevant to Executive Order 12,954 because they have common fea-
tures. 248 The AFL-CIO (a national federation of unions) challenged
Executive Order 12,092 by arguing that President Carter lacked authority
240 Id. at 635.
241 Id. at 637-38.
242 Id. at 637.
245 See concluding discussion, infra notes 427-31 and accompanying text for an explanation
of why Justice Black's functional analysis of executive power should not he applied to Executive
Order 12,954.
244 The President's exclusive and express powers are very limited, consisting of serving as
Commander in Chief, requiring Cabinet heads to submit reports, granting pardons and reprieves,
and appointing interim Senators as vacancies occur. U.S. CoNs•r, art. II, § 2. cl. 1. Other exclusive
and express powers include providing Congress information on the state of the union, convening
or adjourning Congress under exceptional circumstances, receiving ambassadors, and most contro-
versial in the context of executive orders, "tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed...."
Id, at art. II. § 3. The President shares express power with Congress to make treaties; nominate
and appoint ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, and Supreme Court judges; and with
congressional delegation, to appoint inferior officers. See id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
245
 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
246 Id.
247 618 F.2d 784 (1),C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
245 See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
264	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 37:229
under FPASA to debar federal contractors who reached wage agree-
ments with unions in excess of presidential guidelines. They also ar-
gued that the order was invalid because it conflicted with wage and
price legislation prohibiting mandatory wage limits, and with the NLRA's
policy of removing the federal government from collective bargaining.
A district court enjoined the order by concluding inter alia that this
case was controlled by Youngstown, 249 and that the President had no
authority under FPASA to link procurement to price-control stand-
ards. 2"
In reversing the lower court, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that Congress granted the President
broad authority under FPASA to establish procurement policies. 25 ' The
court broadly construed FPASA's policy goal of promoting efficiency
and economy when it reasoned, "This language recognizes that the
Government generally must have some flexibility to seek the greatest
advantage in various situations. 'Economy' and 'efficiency' are not
narrow terms; they encompass those factors like price, quality, suitabil-
ity, and availability of goods or services that are involved in all acquisi-
tion decisions."252 The court also noted that Congress has added social
and economic objectives not strictly related to cost and efficiency to
government procurement programs; 255 and it found that presidents
have imposed additional considerations on the procurement process
under section 205 of FPASA. 254
Unfortunately, in rejecting the argument that Executive Order
12,092 contravened the NLRA and RLA, the court did not explain its
reasoning except to say, "Although the Executive Order represents an
important external factor in the economic environment surrounding
collective bargaining, it does not subvert the integrity of that proc-
ess."2" This creates ambiguity for any future court reviewing an execu-
249 See AFL-C10 v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88,102 (D.D.C.), reu'd, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
25° See id. at 96,
251 See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 788 ("We believe that by emphasizing the leadership role of the
President in setting Government-wide procurement policy on matters common to all agencies,
Congress intended that the President play a direct and active part in supervising the Govern-
ment's management functions.").
252 Id. at 788-89 & n.23 (presenting that part of the FPASA's legislative history in which
Congress encouraged procurement officers to consider '"need, quality of product, or lower
ultimate cost.'").
253 Id. at 789 n.25 (noting that FPASA also included procurement directives that would
benefit small businesses, maintain minimum wage and working condition standards for service
employees, and debar contractors who violated certain federal environmental laws).
254 Id. at 790.
255 Id. at 796.
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five order affecting collective bargaining because it suggests such an
order can place a large restraint on negotiations (by setting a cap on
pay raises that can be negotiated) while implying that such a restraint
is somehow outside the scope of the NLRA. Here the court was sim-
plistic in its reasoning that collective bargaining laws were really unaf-
fected by the order because the order did not alter the processes the
laws provide. The most potent right to strike is a nullity if a law sets a
limit on pay raises.
Although the order in Kahn offers useful comparisons to Execu-
tive Order 12,954, it is distinguishable. In the Kahn situation, Congress
and the President worked in concert to combat intolerable inflation, 256
but the relationship between Congress and the President regarding
Executive Order 12,954 is more clouded. This is because Clinton issued
Executive Order 12,954 only months after the striker-replacement bill's
supporters in Congress failed to garner enough votes to overcome a
filibuster against the bill, even though a majority in both chambers
voted on the record to support it. 257 When a minority in the Senate
defeats legislation by threatening a filibuster, does this mean that
Congress as a body opposed it, or does it mean that the will of Congress
cannot be characterized unambiguously? 258
D. Summary of Contributions Made by Executive Orders
Regulating Private Employment
The constitutionality of executive orders affecting employment
discrimination and collective bargaining is discussed, respectively, in
sections 1V.A and N.B. In contrast, this section briefly summarizes the
public policy contributions these orders made.
First, many orders allowed for experimentation in public policies
affecting private employment, and some experimented with funda-
mental economic and social arrangements. Roosevelt's orders creating
the National Defense Mediation Board, followed by the National War
Labor Board, provided the nation's economy urgently needed, yet
adaptable, dispute resolution institutions. The succession of anti-dis-
criminAtion orders from 1941 to 1975 used workplaces of federal
contractors as a laboratory for a variety of policy innovations, ranging
from broad nondiscrimination principles to more technical enforce-
ment issues. One remarkable aspect of this experimentation was the
256 Kahn, 618 F.2d at 796.
257 Senate Vote Fails, supra note 5, at AA-1; Victory for Business Coalition, supra note 5, at AA-1.
255 See infra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
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introduction of new protected groups, beginning with African Ameri-
cans and later extending to older workers, women, and the disabled.
Second, many of these orders served as models for legislation. As
a result of their experimentation, they occasionally provided Congress
with blueprints for workable and politically feasible legislation. This
explains in part why Congress initially focused on race discrimination
in enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Presidential orders had focused
on this form of discrimination since 1941 and therefore developed a
lengthy track record. It is notable that every employment discrimina-
tion law regarding race, gender, age, and disability followed rather
than preceded a related executive order.
Third, some orders diffused political responsibility for controver-
sial policy innovations. New laws and Supreme Court decisions are
widely reported, sometimes with detailed analysis and commentary. In
contrast, an executive order tends to be less visible unless a president
decides to make it newsworthy. This low visibility may have checked
otherwise hostile public opinion on race discrimination orders.
These orders had other diffusing features. Many dealt with federal
contract administration, a mundane subject that proved difficult to
report with fanfare. In addition, unlike legislation that is often en-
forced with criminal sanctions, many of these orders specified no
sanctions, or the comparatively weak penalty of loss of government
contracts. Had these orders relied on criminal sanctions for their
enforcement, they would have been more visible because indictments,
trials, and sentencing hearings seem to make better news than a con-
tract debarment hearing. By threatening loss of government business,
these orders may have deterred undesirable conduct without mobiliz-
ing adverse public opinion.
The diffusing feature of still other orders was their lofty character,
which may have put them above the plane of political discourse and
debate. Roosevelt's orders putting government in the delicate position
of effectively approving labor agreements illustrate this point. Rhetori-
cal flourishes filled lengthy policy preambles, putting the nation above
seemingly crass self-interest. They also expressed unifying appeals. In
short, they were drafted as if to be read from a patriotic pulpit set high
above political parties and ordinary politicians. It is hard to imagine
legislation with more effective moral incantations than these orders.
Their overarching appeals were more suited to the public's recognition
of the President, and not the Congress, as the national leader.
Fourth, some orders profoundly changed public opinion. Direc-
tives to eradicate race discrimination were continually strengthened.
The Presidents' party affiliation did not seem to matter. This constancy
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probably contributed to a gradual but unrelenting change in public
manners and customs.
Here it is important to note that federal power in the 1940s had
a limited reach into segregated institutions. Elections, schools, city
parks, and community centers were controlled by local boards and
public officials, or state parties and legislatures. This left the workplace,
an instrumentality of national commerce, as the most available place
for federal government inroads against race segregation. Early orders
regulating federal contractors were the main instrument to break the
stranglehold of localized power structures.
Fifth, some orders provided more nimble responses to economic
crises than legislation might have provided. Whether wage and price
controls are appropriate policies in a free-market economy is an open
question. However, there is less room to debate that these policies
require more precise articulation than Congress is usually able to
provide, because the kind of compromise often required to enact laws
would tend to produce more vague standards. Also, a committee of a
few economic experts or labor and management representatives seems
able to respond more quickly to changing conditions than Congress.
Of course, this process is disconnected from voters, except for presi-
dential elections, and experts can do more harm than good. But this
expert-driven policy-making process usually occurred after Congress
broadly delegated power to the President to fashion these instruments.
It therefore follows that Congress always retained an ultimate check
over these insulated elites.
III. REPLACEMENT STRIKES AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,954
Executive Order 12,954 blends characteristics of executive orders
affecting collective bargaining and race discrimination. It must be
grouped with orders affecting private-sector collective bargaining be-
cause it limits an employer's right to hire permanent striker replace-
ments. But'it stands out in this group for several reasons. Most of these
orders were meant to be temporary. Seizure and dispute resolution
orders were intended to last only as long as the nation was at war, and
wage and price controls only as long as inflation remained too high.
Clinton's order, in contrast, is intended as a permanent part of federal
procurement.
Many of the other orders imposed extreme measures: taking an
employer's private property, running a private business, or placing a
strict ceiling on workers' raises. In addition, some employers under
seizure orders had much less control over circumstances leading to a
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seizure. An unreasonable union could force a seizure simply by threat-
ening to strike or refusing to settle with an employer.
In contrast, an employer under Executive Order 12,954 always
remains in control of whether a sanction will be applied. There are
many effective employer responses to strikes, including subcontracting
work, hiring temporary replacements, contracting with employment
agencies who employ workers to perform struck work, and building
inventory in advance of a strike. There is no assurance that any of these
methods will be superior to settling with strikers, but there is evidence
that employers can use these methods indefinitely and profitably. 259 In
short, prohibiting employers from hiring permanent replacements
eliminates only one of several employer responses to strikes and, there-
fore, is neither a seizure nor an extreme limitation on management
rights.
Also, Executive Order 12,954 differs from most other orders af-
fecting collective bargaining because its scope is more limited. Many
orders affected virtually every employer whose enterprise had some
relationship to the war, even ordinary city bus companies who drove
workers to factories. 260 In contrast, Clinton's order affects a relatively
small minority of employers who do more than $100,000 of business
with the federal government,'" and more specifically, a much smaller
portion who hire permanent striker replacements. 262
The main enforcement tool in Clinton's order, contract debar-
ment, gives it an unusual character since this is derived from antidis-
crimination orders. It also provides employers due process rights set
259 See Robert L. Rose, Temporary Heaven; A Job at Struck Caterpillar, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29,
1994, at Bl , B7 [hereinafter Rose, Temporary Heaven] (reporting Caterpillar's hiring of many
temporary replacements for striking UAW workers); see also Robert L. Rose, Caterpillar and
Striking UAW Meet U.S. Mediator; Firm Curbs Agenda, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1995, at Al 4 (reporting
that Caterpillar had the "upper hand" in responding to a large strike, in part because temporary
workers have helped keep their plants open).
In 1994, while Bridgestone/Firestone was struck and operated with 2300 replacements, who
were then only temporary hires, sales improved 11% compared to 1993, and profits rose sharply,
from $6 million to $29 million. Business Briefs, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 28, 1995, at 4C. Replace-
ments were not given permanent status until January 1995. See Narisetti, supra note 21, at A3.
260 See Exec. Order No. 9570, 10 Fed. Reg. 7235 (1945).
261 Although the percentage of employers affected by Executive Order 12,954 is not reported,
an upper limit of this percentage can be estimated. Approximately 22% of the labor force and
more than 100,000 companies have federal contracts in excess of $50,000 that are administered
by the Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance. Asra Q. Nomani, Affirmative
Action Agency Is Assailed for Pushing Quotas, Preferential Hiring, WALL ST, J., June 16, 1995, at B8.
Since Executive Order I2,954's $100,000 threshold is higher, the order would apply to fewer than
100,000 companies and 22% of the labor force.
262 See GAO STRIKE REPLACEMENT REPORT, supra note 24, at 13 (estimating that one-sixth of
all employers actually hired permanent striker replacements in the 1980s).
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forth in these orders. Thus, Executive Order 12,954 is a hybrid of these
two types of executive orders.
The constitutionality of Executive Order 12,954 cannot be deter-
mined without examining issues raised in this section. In section III.A
the origin of the striker-replacement doctrine is reviewed. This inquiry
shows that employers' right to hire permanent replacements has dubi-
ous roots in a Supreme Court decision that stated this principle as
dictum rather than a holding. Employers unquestionably have a right
to hire permanent replacements, but as the analysis here shows, the
questionable origins of the doctrine have resulted in the NLRB sig-
nificantly limiting its application. This section calls into question em-
ployer suggestions that the right to hire permanent replacements is
absolute. That right has significant, well-recognized limits and Clin-
ton's order is consistent with these limits because it applies to a small
class of employers who do business with the federal government.
Section IJI.B presents evidence showing that strikes involving per-
manent replacements have occurred more frequently since the 1970s.
A significant number of these strikes have affected nationally promi-
nent employers, including some federal contractors. Evidence is pre-
sented to show that these strikes have usually been bitter and disor-
derly, and occasionally, dangerously violent. This evidence is relevant
to the constitutional analysis of Executive Order 12,954 because the
order relies on a statute that broadly empowers presidents to consider
matters of economy and efficiency in government procurement. Evi-
dence presented here suggests, without proving, that employers who
hire permanent striker replacements encounter serious disruptions
to business, incur high turnover among replacements, and are con-
fronted with picket line obstructions. All of these matters may affect
the quality of products procured by the government, or the timely
delivery of these products. Thus, this section shows a rational nexus
between the order's assumptions concerning the external effects of
replacement strikes and the procurement needs of the government.
Section III.0 presents the history of failed attempts by labor to
enact the Workplace Fairness Act, a bill to ban hiring of permanent
striker replacements. A careful examination of this history is needed
to evaluate the employer contention that Clinton acted unconstitution-
ally by contradicting the will of Congress. In fact, the striker-replace-
ment bill was supported by a majority in both chambers by the 102d
and 103d Congress, but was not enacted because of several technical
votes to head off a threatened Republican filibuster. In short, the bill
was defeated by a minority in the Senate determined to filibuster the
bill. This history shows, therefore, that the will of Congress was not
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opposed to the striker-replacement bill. Under these circumstances, it
is more accurate to characterize congressional will as ambiguous.
Section III.D reports the elements of Executive Order 12,954, as
well as the Clinton Administration's rationale and evidentiary support
for the order. This section explains why employers are correct in
characterizing this order as a political expedient for the President.
Evidence is presented showing that Clinton raised labor's expectation
when first elected and then profoundly disappointed this large interest
group by advocating NAFTA. Consequently, there developed an un-
usual rift between the AFL-CIO and a Democratic president.
Employers, therefore, are correct in stating that Clinton's order is
an attempt to renew labor's active support for his reelection. But this
does not invalidate the order as unconstitutional. By this logic, Presi-
dent Bush's two executive orders on collective bargaining, occurring
nearer to a presidential election, would be unconstitutional. The con-
stitutionality of Clinton's order depends, instead, on whether it was
issued in a manner consistent with the orders reviewed in sections II.A
and ILB, and in accordance with Congress's delegation of procure-
ment power to the President under FPASA.
A. Striker-Replacement Doctrine Preceding the Order
Although the Clinton Administration cited a government-procure-
ment rationale for its order, 2" its primary motivation was to limit the
striker-replacement doctrine of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co. 264
 In that 1938 decision, an employer reinstated all but five replaced
strikers who offered to return to work unconditionally, and discrimi-
nated against these few on the basis of their union activities. 265
 Al-
though the Court's decision favored the union, 266
 it also declared in
dictum, "[lit does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act de-
nounced by the [NLRA], has lost the right to protect and continue his
business by supplying places left vacant by strikers."267
262 See Exec. Order No. 12,954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.2(a) (1995).
264
 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
265 Id. at 339.
265 See id. at 346. The Court stated,
[t]he claim put forward [by the NLRB] is that the unfair labor practice indulged
by the respondent was discrimination in reinstating striking employes by keeping
out certain of them for the sole reason that they had been active in the union....
Any such discrimination in putting them back to work is ... prohibited by section
8.
Id.
267 Id. at 345. In this passage, the Court specifically referenced § 13 of the NLRA, which
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Some scholars have questioned the legitimacy of a doctrine rooted
in dictum,2° but an historical analysis suggests that the Mackay Radio
Court unconsciously reflected a rich accumulation of American and
English common law dating to an 1824 English law expressly giving
workers the right to induce their fellows to join them in a work stop-
page strike, provided that such strikers do not "willfully and maliciously
force another" to stop working. 269
 In so many words, this English law
states the basic striker-replacement doctrine: Workers are entitled to
withhold their labor and peacefully persuade their fellows to join in,
but employers are entitled to continue operations with replacements,
and strikers have no right beyond peaceful persuasion to interfere with
their work. In short, Mackay Radio's striker-replacement doctrine was
not as novel as some commentators have suggested; but it should not
have been given the precedential value that is usually given on the basis
of stare decisis.
In attacking Executive Order 12,954, employers give the impres-
sion that Mackay Radio conferred upon employers an unlimited right
to hire permanent striker replacements:27° Therefore, they argue, a
limitation as serious as the one imposed by Clinton's order is con-
trary to striker-replacement doctrine. But this view is erroneous and
misleading because it takes no account of significant restrictions that
the Supreme Court and NLRB have imposed on the Mackay Radio
doctrine.
The first limitation appears in Mackay Radio's holding: a striker
cannot be permanently replaced when an employer unlawfully dis-
provided, "(n)othing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike." Id. (current version, as amended, available at 29 U.S,C. § 163
(1994)). Thus, the Court did not view hiring of permanent striker replacements as an infringe-
ment of the right to strike. See id.
268 See Craver, supra note 19, at 421; Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of
the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 548; Paul Weiler, Striking A New Balance: Freedom of
Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 388 (1984).
269
 Michael Fl. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in the Public Policy of Striker Replacements: Combi-
nation, Conspiracy, Concert and Cartelization, 34 B.C. L, REV. 257, 274 (1995) (quoting 5 Geo. 4,
ch. 95, § 5 (1824)).
270
 Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-49. The complaint states:
[T]he Act confers an affirmative right to hire replacement workers and that right
is integral to federal labor policy. Although bills to restrict or eliminate manage-
ment's right to hire replacement workers have been introduced in Congress over
the years—most recently last year, when the so-called "Workers' Fairness Act" was
considered—Congress has conspicuously failed to enact any of them.
Id. There is no mention in the entire employer memorandum of significant Supreme Court and
NLRB limitations on the striker-replacement doctrine. By discussing only failed legislation to
restrict this doctrine, the employer memorandum creates an erroneous impression that the right
to hire permanent replacements is virtually unrestricted.
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criminates on the basis of protected union activity."' Thus, an em-
ployer is not entitled to induce a replacement to take a striker's job by
offering a benefit that destroys the right to strike. 272
 The concept has
been broadened to a more general limitation: in an unfair labor
practice ("ULP") strike initiated in whole or in part in response to
unfair practices committed by an employer, strikers are entitled to
immediate reinstatement to their jobs upon offering unconditionally
to return to work.'" My recent research shows the breadth of this
limitation on the Mackay Radio doctrine. In approximately one in
seven replacement strike cases, the NLRB ruled that the dispute in-
volved a ULP strike.'" In addition to these limitations, an employer
cannot indefinitely postpone reinstatement of a replaced striker, but
rather, must offer that striker reinstatement to her position or an
equivalent job when such an opening occurs. 276
Thus, while restrictions on an employer's right to hire permanent
striker replacements are quite limited and give many employers a
considerable advantage over strikers, the striker-replacement doctrine
has been narrowed in some important respects since 1938. Clearly, it
is not the kind of absolute right portrayed by employers in their
suit challenging Executive Order 12,954. In this light, Clinton's order
amounts to just another limitation on this employer right. No one
would argue today that the ULP doctrine is contrary to Mackay Radio,
but it vitiates this right in approximately one in seven NLRB cases.
Likewise, Clinton's order stands to vitiate this right for approximately
twenty percent of those employers who have federal contracts more
than $100,000.276
B. Increase in Replacement Strikes and Violence Preceding the Order
Recent evidence shows that replacement strikes have been occur-
ring more frequently, though the beginning of this upsurge has not
been clearly identified. Union leaders and some elected officials be-
271 Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 339.
272 See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963) (ruling that an employer's
offer of 20 years super-seniority to replacement workers was inherently destructive of the right to
strike because it unlawfully discriminated against strikers engaged in protected activity).
273 See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
1007-11 (Charles Morris ed., 1983).
271
 Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Treatment of Permanently Replaced Strikers, 1935-1991: Public
Policy Implications, 13 YALE LAW & POL'Y REV. 1, 21 (1995).
275 See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967); Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414
F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
276 See Nomani, supra note 261.
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lieve that President Reagan's hiring of over 11,000 permanent replace-
ments for striking air traffic controllers in 1981 marked the beginning
of this period.'" My research on 299 replacement strikes reaches a
preliminary conclusion that replacement strikes began to increase in
the mid-1970s. 278
 Another study and a rare expose indirectly support
this finding by presenting evidence of increasing influence of union-
busting consultants during the 1970s.279
 But the only U.S. government
study on replacement strikes adds to the ambiguity of when this trend
began. Using a crude research design asking union negotiators to
compare this activity for the 1970s and 1980s, the study concluded
these strikes occurred more often in the most recent decade. 28° Also,
case studies suggest that these strikes became significant in the 1980s. 28 '
277 See, e.g., United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers, 525 F. Supp. 820, 822 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (reporting the firing of striking PATCO members); Herbert R. Northrup, The Rise
and Demise of PATCO, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 167 (1984) (presenting a detailed description
of this important strike).
Union perceptions that President Reagan's hiring of PATCO striker replacements caused
other employers to hire striker replacements appear in Prohibiting Permanent Replacement of
Striking Workers, 1991: Hearing on H.R. 5 Before the Suhcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on
Public Work and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1991) (statement of Juliette Lenoir,
Vice President, Association of Flight Attendants) ("[M]ost labor unions mark the 1981 action of
former President Reagan, when he fired 12,000 striking members of the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers, as the contemporary beginning of the use of permanent replacement workers."). In
addition, a 1991 House committee report reflected union testimony:
President Reagan's firing and permanent replacement of 12,000 striking air traffic
controllers in 1981 had a dramatic impact on the way Americans view strikes,
including the view taken by a new generation of corporate managers.... President
Reagan's action was regarded by many observers as a signal to the business com-
munity that it was acceptable to dismiss striking workers. The events surrounding
the air traffic controllers' strike ushered in a much more aggressive, and even
hostile, employer strategy toward lawful strikes.
HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE:, DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PARTICIPATION IN LABOR
DISPUTES, HR. REP. No. 57, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 20 (1991).
"'Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements: Empirical
Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16 BERKELEY J. or EMI'. & LAB. L. 169, 184-91
(1995) (showing that replacement strikes sharply increased in 1975 and remained at abnormally
high levels through the end of the sample period in 1991).
2" See imp; J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONIZATION 94 (1990) ("There is general
consensus on all sides that consultant use by employers expanded substantially throughout the
1970s and into the 1980s."); see also MARTIN JAY LEVF17, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER (1993)
(depicting a consultant's personal account).
280
 GAO STRIKE REPLACEMENT REPORT, .supra note 24, at 18.
281
 A detailed analysis of the meatpacking industry by Charles Craypo shows how one firm's
use of striker replacements eventually broke an industry-wide pattern agreement that led com-
petitor firms to adopt this tactic:
Five more rounds of bargaining at Dakota City between 1969 and 1986 completed
the process. Each ended in a lengthy dispute, ranging in duration from four to
fourteen months. Each arose from [BP's refusal to follow industry pattern settle-
ments and often from its insistence on wage freezes or cuts. Each also ended with
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While the beginning of this trend has not been clearly iden-
tified, it is more evident that these strikes affected large employers in
certain industries. These included meatpacking and food processing
(George A. Horme1,282
 Monfort of Colorado,283 Conagra,284 Diamond
Walnut,285 and Clougherty Packing Co. 286), paper products (Boise Cas-
cade287 and International Paper288), and newspapers (Chicago Tribune, 2"
New York Daily News,29° Pittsburgh Press, 291
 San Francisco Chronicle,292
and Detroit Free Press293), coal and copper mines (Phelps Dodge, 294 A.T.
the company remaining below the base wages paid by traditional union packers.
The union lacked the power to force 11313 into pattern bargaining because it could
not strike the Dakota City plant effectively against the use of replacement workers
and the company's alternative sources of beef production.
Charles Craypo, Meatpacking: Industry Restrucuring and Union Decline, in CONTEMPORARY COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 63, 72 (Paula Voos ed., 1994).
282 See William Serrin, Hormel Plant Shuts as Troops Arrive and Strikers Thin Ranks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1986, at Al2; William Serrin, Hormel Opens Plant As Guardsmen Bar Strikers, N.Y. Timis,
Jan. 23, 1986, at Alt [hereinafter Hormel Opens Plant]; William Serrin, Hormel Plan Dismisses
Hundreds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1986, at A15; William Serrin, Strike by Meatpackers Splits Family
Loyalties, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 25, 1986, at 7; Hormel Reports Hiring Completed At Strikebound Minnesota
Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1986, at 316; see also HARDY GREEN, ON STRIKE AT HORMEL: THE
STRUGGLE FOR A DEMOCRATIC LABOR MOVEMENT (1990); DAVE HAGE & PAUL KLAUDA, No
RETREAT, No SURRENDER: LABOR'S WAR AT HORMEL (1989).
283 See Monfort of Colorado, 298 N.L.R.B. 73 (1990).
284 See Joseph S. Stroud, Strife Spoiling Promise of Carter Plant, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
Dec. 19, 1993, at I (reporting on a replacement strike at Cook Family Foods, a division of
Conagra); Sam Adams, Christmas Will Just Be Another Day for Strikers at Cooks, THE DAILY
INDEPENDENT, Dec. 24, 1993, at 1 (reporting that the strike involved 400 strikers).
285 See Diamond Walnut Growers, 316 N.L.R.B. 36 (1995); Diamond Walnut Growers, 312
N.L.R.B. 61 (1993) (reporting that the employer hired replacements for 500-600 strikers);
Teamsters Say Diamond Walnut Should Be Sanctioned, supra note 23, at D5.
288 See Clougherty Packing Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 1139 (1989) (involving approximately 1000
strikers, some of whom were permanently replaced).
287 See Adrienne Eaton & Jill Kreisky, Collective Bargaining in the Paper Industry: Developments
Since 1979, in CONTEMPORARY COLLEC'T'IVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, Supra note 281,
at 25, 45 (reporting Boise Cascade's hiring of 342 replacements in a 1986 strike).
288
 See Adrienne Bierecree, Capital Restructuring and Labor Relations: The International Paper
Strike, in I INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO LABOUR STUDIES 59, 72-73 (Gerald Berk ed.,
1991)
285 See Chicago Tribune Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 259 (1991).
29° See Permanent Replacement Workers Called Key Issue as Daily News Strike Continues, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 210, at A-13 (Oct. 30, 1990).
281 See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Pittsburgh Papers Publish, But Strikers Block Trucks, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 1992, at A8; see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Preate, 797 F. Supp. 436, 444 (W.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 981 F,2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1992).
282 See San Francisco Papers Threaten to Replace Striking Employees, Daily Lab, Rep. (BNA), at
A-5, A-6 (Nov. 7, 1994).
291 See Nichole M. Christian, Deadline Pressure: Detroit Newspapers Face an Ugly Standoff with
Striking Unions, WALL. ST . J., Aug. 9, 1995, at Al, A5 (reporting on the Detroit Free Press's plans
to hire permanent replacements for 2500 strikers).
294 See JoNATHAN ROSENBLUM, THE COPPER CRUCIBLE (1994); see also United Steelworkers v.
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Massey,295
 Pittston Coal Group296), airline and bus carriers (Continental
Airlines,297 United Airlines, 296 TWA,299 Eastern,"° and Greyhound"'),
tire makers (Bridgestone/Firestone 2 and Pirelli Armstrong 303), assorted
manufacturers (Colt Industries,304
 Ravenswood,"' and Caterpillar"6),
and major league sports (major league baseball umpires). 307
Phelps Dodge Corp., 833 F.2d 804 (9th Cir, 1987); End Nears for Copper Strikers, Cm. Mutt., July
7, 1985, at 5A.
295 See Tall Timber Mine and United Mine Workers, District 17, Local Union 1440 (Mar, 24,
1992) (LeRoy, Arb.) [hereinafter A.T. Massey] (unpublished decision on file with author),
296 After Pittston hired permanent striker replacements, picket line violence broke out,
notwithstanding the Mine Workers' efforts to use civil disobedience as a means of protest, and
as a result, a local court levied a $64 million coercive civil contempt fine. See International Union,
United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994); see also B, Drummond Ayers, ,fr., Coal
Miners' Strike Hits Feelings 7'hat Go Deep, N.Y. Timm, Apr. 27, 1989, at A16; Michael deCourcy
Hinds, Bitter Strike May Be At An End, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1989, at A17; Ratification of Pittston
Contract Hailed by Union Leaders, Secretary Dole, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No, 35, at A-7, A- 10 (Feb.
21, 1990).
297 See In re Continental Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990); O'Neill v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 886 F.2d 1438 (5th Cir. 1989).
298
 See Rakestraw v. United Airlines, Inc., 981 F.2d 1524 (7th Cir. 1992); Air Line Pilots Ass'n
v. United Airlines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1986).
299 See TWA v. Independent Fed. of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
800 SeeAir Line Pilots Ass'n v. Eastern Airlines, 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Eastern Airlines
Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 744 F. Supp. 1140 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
3° ' Proposed Greyhound Settlement Includes $22 Million in Back Pay, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 210, at A13 (Apr. 21, 1990).
"See Narisetti, supra, note 21, at A4; Raju Narisetti, Bridgestone/Firestone Begins to Hire
Permanent Replacements for Strikers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1995, at A3.
"See Pirelli Armstrong Strike to End, supra note 22, at A-9 (reporting that 850 strikers were
permanently replaced after beginning a strike on July 15, 1994, but were later offered reinstate-
ment when the NLRB found that the company's unilateral implementation of contract terms
converted this economic strike to an unfair labor practice strike).
304
 See NLRB Administrative Law Judge Finds Colt Strike Caused Unfair Labor Practices, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 177, at A-11 (Sept. 14, 1989); Colt TOld To Rehire 800 Strikers; Back Pay Is
TO Be in Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1989, at B3.
3°5
 Special Report: Anatomy of A Corporate Campaign, 46 Union Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at
144 (May 7, 1992).
3°6
 In 1992, Caterpillar threatened to hire thousands of permanent striker replacements, and
came close to succeeding before the UAW called off its strike. See Philip Dine, Job Seekers Besiege
Caterpillar; Strikers Resist Urge to Give Up, Sr. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 8, 1992, at 10A; Gregory
A. Patterson & Robert Rose, Labor Makes A Stand in Fight for Its Future at Caterpillar; Inc., WALL.
ST. J., Apr. 7, 1992, at Al; Robert L. Rose, Thousands Respond to Caterpillar Ads to Replace Striking
Workers in Illinois, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1992, at A3; Bob Secter, Caterpillar, UAW Agree to 7'alits but
Cling to Demands, L.A. Thus, Apr. 11, 1992, at A20. In 1994 the UAW renewed its strike, but
Caterpillar responded by hiring temporary replacements. See Robert L. Rose, Work Week, WALL
ST. J., May 23, 1995, at Al (reporting that 5600 temporary workers and retirees were filling in
for strikers); see also Stephen Franklin, He's Not One to Give In Easily, Cm. Tom, May 21, 1995,
at El.
307 See Jerome Holtzman, Umps' Strike Is Almost At An End, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 20, 1979,
at 120.
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What is more remarkable, these strikes have been much more
disorderly and violent than nonreplacement strikes. Replaced strikers
in diverse industries have threatened replacements and customers;"
littered roads with tire-puncturing jackrocks" and blocked work en-
trances;"° damaged cars transporting replacements to work" and at-
tempted to force these cars off the road while giving chase; 312 and
less frequently, rioted," shot," bombed, 313 burned,316 assaulted," and
305 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 121 B.R. 428, 431
(S.D.N,Y. 1990) (describing replaced strikers calling passengers "'scab' and 'cheap ass' while
telling them to have a shit flight, [and] that they would be 'killed' and not to forget their 'body
bag'"); Keco Industries, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 1469, 1474 (1985) (reporting a replaced striker who
struck with a rock a car of an employee crossing a picket line to work, and who confronted the
driver by yelling, "I'll blow your fucking heads off").
an See, e.g., International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2563
(1994) (overturning $52 million in civil coercive contempt fines against the union for, inter alia,
littering county highways with jackrocks); Mine Workers Chief Says Pittston Strike Underscores Need
for Overhaul of Labor Law, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 160, at A-9, A-11 (Aug. 21, 1989) (reporting
a Pittston Official's account that striker jackrocks had punctured over 3000 tires since the strike
began).
510 See, e.g., Domsey Trading Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 777, 778 (1993) (replaced strikers blockade
bus carrying replacement workers); Ayers, supra, note 296, at A16 (reporting mass numbers of
replaced strikers laying down before trucks at entrances to coal processing plants).
311 See, e.g., Circuit-Wise, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1091, 1108 (1992) (reporting replaced striker
damaging with a pipe a car crossing the picket line); Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075,
1091 (1990) (reporting replaced strikers spraying replacements' cars with paint solvent as they
crossed the picket line).
512 See, e.g., Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1303 (1993) (replaced striker tries to
force replacement worker's car off the road); Coal Striker Gives Alford Plea, DAILY INDEPENDENT,
Dec. 24, 1994, at 7 (Ashland, Ky., copy on file with author) (reporting a striker's conviction for
wanton endangerment after attempting to drive replacements off the road).
313 See, e.g., Hormel Closes Plant Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1986, at 54; Hormel Reports Hiring
Completed at Strikebound Minnesota Plant, N.Y. TIKE.s, Feb. 13, 1986, at B16 (reporting rioting by
hundreds of replaced strikers).
534 See, e.g., Shots Fired at Cook's; No Injuries Reported, GRATSON-JOURNAL ENQUIRER, Dec. 22,
1993, at 1 (Grayson, Ky., copy on file with author); Two Striking Greyhound Drivers Arrested on
Federal Firearms Charge, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A -4, A-5 (Apr. 13, 1990) (reporting that
two replaced strikers were arrested on federal charges in connection with two shooting incidents
near St. Louis).
315 See, e.g., Report from the Picket Lines: Rubber Strike Starting to Burn, LAN. TRENDS, Dec. 3,
1994, at 1 (reporting a striker was charged with bombing the home of a replacement in Polk
County, Iowa).
316 See Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1992).
317 See, e.g., Diamond Walnut Growers, 312 N.L.R.B. 61, 64 (reporting that a replacement
worker was "severely beaten" by two to three men, who were probably replaced strikers); Union-
Represented Driver Killed During Strike at San Francisco Papers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at
A-9 (Nov. 8, 1994) (reporting that strikers pulled a replacement driver from a truck and beat
him-death reported in headline was an accidental electrocution); San Francisco Newspaper
Employees Ratify Five-Year, Strike Ending Pacts, Daily Lab. Rep. (DNA) No. 218, at A-12, A-13 (Nov.
15, 1994) (later reporting that guard was stabbed in the abdomen).
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killed. 318 Occasionally, replacement workers have been violent. 319 A
federal appeals court found that violence is so inherent in replacement
strikes that it rejected an NLRB doctrine permitting unions to obtain
a list of names and addresses of striker replacements. 32°
In sum, there has been relatively little research on replacement
strikes, but this much has become clear: these strikes became more
common during the past twenty years without showing any sign of
diminishing. The fact that they clustered in particular industries sug-
gests that they have a contagious quality. Unquestionably, they gener-
ated conflict and serious law-enforcement problems for affected com-
munities. Employers may be correct in stating that hiring replacements
enabled them to be more competitive by lowering labor costs,'"' but
this ignores two potentially harmful aspects that the Clinton Admini-
stration addressed in Executive Order 12,954. Disruptions in produc-
tion and delivery occasioned by these strikes since the 1980s raise a
318 See, e.g., Williams Calls for Quick Legal Action in Picket Line Deaths in Alabama Strike, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at A-5, A-6 (Sept. 9, 1993) (reporting on a replacement strike in
Alabama in which two strikers were killed by tractor-trailer crossing the picket line at a high-rate
of speed); Shooting Investigation, THE CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEWS-GAZE rrE, July 24, 1993, at A-8
(copy on file with author) (reporting the shooting death of a striker replacement as he crossed
a picket line to work for Arch Mineral Corp. in West Virginia).
319 See, e.g., International Paper Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 31, 31 (1992) (nonstriker attacks replaced
striker with baseball bat); United Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 833 E2d 804, 807 (9th Cir.
1987) (reporting that replacements attacked strikers by slashing their tires, breaking a striker's
jaw with a rifle butt, and making threatening calls to a striker's wife).
320 See Chicago Tribune Co., 965 F.2d at 247. Judge Posner rejected the Board's "dear and
present danger" test for granting a union's request for names of striker replacements by
reasoning:
The pattern of violence that marked the strike was bound to arouse concern in [the
replacement workers'] minds about their personal safety should their names be
disclosed. It is not as if the union had stood virtuously aloof from the violence: after
a riot outside one of the company's facilities the union was enjoined from engaging
in violent picketing. . .
Where the Board got the idea that a union's demand for the names of replace-
ment workers is to be handled not like any other discovery request but by placing
on the company an insuperable burden of proving that the union will in fact use
the information to harass the workers beats us.
Id.
321 See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (involving employees
who went out on strike and were permanently replaced after their employer, who specifically
disclaimed financial inability to agree to union proposals for modest increases, unilaterally slashed
wages 30% and medical and vacation benefits 50%); Curtis Industries, Inc. Employees Return to
Work April 26, Ending Four
- Year Walkout, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 79, at A-4, A-5 (Apr. 26,
1994) [hereinafter Curtis Industries Walkout to End] (reporting on a replacement strike that lasted
four years in which the employer demanded over 50 contract concessions, including revocation
of retiree health benefits).
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legitimate concern for federal government procurement, and the vio-
lence these strikes engender are contrary to a federal policy of resolv-
ing labor disputes through peaceful negotiations.
C. Failed Striker-Replacement Legislation Preceding the Order
During the three Congresses preceding Executive Order 12,954,
unions made passage of a striker-replacement ban their top legislative
priority. 322 Their bill, eventually titled the Workplace Fairness Act, pro-
posed to amend the RLA and NLRA by making two employer practices
unlawful: hiring any permanent replacement for a striker, 323 and grant-
ing any permanent replacement an employment preference over a
replaced striker. 324 If enacted, the bill would have repealed Mackay
Radio325 and TWA v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants," 6 thereby
322 Appealing to U.S. senators, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland called the bill "the most
important labor law initiative to come before the Congress in more than a decade." Muriel
Cooper, Labor Mobilizes for Final Push on S. 55, AFL-CIO NEWS, July 8, 1991, at 1. Three years
later, with the bill still not passed, Kirkland reaffirmed its great importance when he said, "We
will spare no resource to ensure that permanent replacements are never permanent and that
employers who resort to this approach are marked in their community as unworthy of patronage
by decent citizens." Michael Byrne, 8.55 Defeat Shows Need for Political Action, AFL-CIO NEWS,
Aug. 8, 1994, at 4.
523 The centerpiece of the bill would have made it unlawful Ibr an employer "to offer, or to
grant, the status of permanent replacement employee to an individual for performing bargaining
unit work for the employer during a labor dispute." H.R. 3936, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
324 The second part of the bill would have made it unlawful for an employer:
to otherwise offer, or grant, an individual any employment preference based on the
fact that such individual was employed, or indicated a willingness to be employed,
during a labor dispute over an individual who—
(A) was an employee of the employer at the commencement of the dispute;
(B) has exercised the right to join, to assist, or to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
through the labor organization involved in the dispute; and
(C) is working for, or has unconditionally offered to return to work For, the
employer.
Id.
325 See H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 277. The report notes:
Some opponents of [the bill] suggested that the right to hire permanent replace-
ments would not destroy the right to strike because, under the Mackay doctrine,
strikers who do not get their jobs back after a strike retain a preferential right to
be hired for vacancies which arise in the future. Experience in the airline industry
suggests that this right to preferential rehire is often illusory.
Id, pt. 1, at 5.
526 See id. pt. 2, at 4 (observing that in TWA v. Independent Fed. of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426 (1989), "the Supreme Court extended the doctrine first espoused in Mackay. . . This
case applies only to workers covered under the RLA; however, many labor lawyers predict that it
will be extended to NLRA cases as well").
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limiting employer responses to strikes. Employers and their congres-
sional supporters vigorously contended that this law would significantly
harm the American economy, 327 but failed to note that employers
would continue to have a right to employ temporary replacements
indefinitely, as Caterpillar has done with notable success. 328
The bill died in 1990 when it failed to be reported out of a Senate
subcommittee. 329 It came closer to passage in 1992 when, despite Presi-
dent Bush's veto promise, 33" it passed in the House but was defeated
on a cloture motion in the Senate."' It was promptly reintroduced
when the 103d Congress convened,"2 and seemed more likely to pass
527 See 140 CLING. Rae. S8537-01 (July 12, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("Without the
prospect of permanent striker replacement, unions will resort to the strike weapon more and
more frequently. Consumer prices will rise, jobs will be lost, communities will plunge into chaos.");
Preventing Replacement of Economic Strikers: Hearing on S. 2112 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2c1 Sess. 126 (1990) (statement of James P.
Melican, senior vice president of International Paper) ("Why does an employer hire permanent
replacements? Usually it is because the only alternative is to shut down the operation. Very few
employers can keep an operation running for any sustained period of time utilizing supervisory
personnel, and temporary replacements are frequently impossible to come by.").
328
 Faced with a second massive strike since 1991, this employer pulled back from its earlier
threat to hire permanent replacements arid used numerous temporary replacements instead. See
Rose, Temporary Heaven, supra note 259, at 131, 117 (reporting Caterpillar's engagement with an
employment agency that supplied the company with many temporary striker replacements). This
practice would have remained entirely lawful under the Workplace Fairness Act. While employing
temporary replacements, Caterpillar profits cliMbed 35% in the second quarter of 1995, and the
company credibly reported that the on-going strike was having no impact on their business. See
Caterpillar Inc.: Second Period Net Climbed 35% on 17% Revenue Rise, WALL Si. J.July 20, 1995,
at B4.
9s9 See Strike Replacement Bill Introduced by Rep. Clay, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at A-7
(Feb. 5, 1990) (reporting introduction of the first bill to ban hiring of permanent striker
replacements); Rep. Clay Chides Employers for Refusing Invitation to Testify on Strike. Bill, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No, 185, at A-9 (Sept, 24, 1990) (reporting that the bill died in subcommittee).
330 The House passed the bill on a recorded vote, 247-182, on July 17, 1991, but was
sidetracked by a threatened filibuster. Striker Replacement Bill Faces Uncertain Future in Senate,
Daily Lab. Rep. (RNA) No. 143, at A- 17 (July 25, 1991). Consequently, the bill was riot brought
before the full Senate until nearly a year later. President Bush dampened prospects for passing
the bill when he threatened to veto it. See Policy Statement on S 55, supra note 5, at F-1. He stated
the bill "would destroy a prime component of the economic balance between labor and manage-
ment in collective bargaining." Id. As the bill was being readied for Senate debate, Sen. Robert
Packwood offered a compromise version that would have limited an employer's right to hire
permanent replacements if a union refused to submit to its dispute to an advisory fact-finding
panel and went out on strike. See Senate Fails To Invoke Cloture on Striker Replacement Bill, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at A-10 (June 12, 1992); Text of Substitute Version of S 55, Including the
Packwood Amendment, Daily Lab, Rep. (BNA) No. 115, at D-I, D-2 (June 15, 1992),
991
 On June 16, 1992, the bill and its proposed amendments failed on a 57-42 vote to limit
debate. Senate Kills Bill to Restrict Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 117, at A-17 Untie 17, 1992).
992 See Striker Replacement Bill Introduced by Rep. Clay, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at A-10,
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with a newly elected president who expressed support for it," 3 but
failed again on a Senate cloture motion. 334 Election of a Republican
Congress committed to employer interests 333 nullified any prospect for
reintroduction of the Workplace Fairness Act.
D. Executive Order 12,954
1. Political Motivation
There can be little doubt that the order was politically inspired,
but this hardly makes the order unique. President Bush issued two
orders directed against unions three years earlier, and they too were
politically motivated.'"
First, President Clinton has been personally involved in replace-
ment strikes to an unusual extent. 337 As a presidential candidate, he
stood with striking Caterpillar workers who were then threatened with
permanent replacement. 338 After assuming office, he personally ef-
fected a settlement when American Airlines flight attendants went on
strike just before Thanksgiving in 1993 and were threatened with
permanent replacement. 339 In a different matter, his Secretary of La-
bor, a close personal friend and confidant, became embroiled in a
workplace safety dispute with Bridgestone/Firestone."° Later, when the
A-11 (Jan. 6, 1993) (reporting Rep. Clay's introduction of the striker-replacement bill that failed
in the previous Congress).
333 Labor's Agenda Seen Rising Under Clinton, supra note 5, at A-6.
334 Senate Vote Fails, supra note 5, at AA-1; Victory for Business Coalition, supra note 5, at AA-1.
335 See Hearings in House, Senate Will Open Debate over Davis-Bacon Repeal or Reform, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at A-7 (Feb. 14, 1995) (reporting a Republican bill to curb prevailing
wage legislation favored by unions); Selected Statements Before Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee on Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act (S 295), Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 28,
at E-1 (Feb. 10, 1995) (reporting a Republican bill to ease NLRA restrictions on employee
involvement activities controlled by employers).
536 See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
337 Frank Swoboda, President Treads New Ground, Congress Wonders if It Should Follow Suit,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1995, at D2 (reporting that more than any other president, Clinton has been
personally involved in a dozen strikes).
"8 See Senators Urge Role in Caterpillar Strike, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 9, 1992, at CIO (reporting
presidential candidate Bill Clinton's address before thousands of replaced striker outside the
gates of Caterpillar's East Peoria plant: It's not good business to replace workers. The way to
resolve a strike is not to replace workers. They have a right to strike and shouldn't risk losing
their jobs over it.").
339 See Tom Yancy & Tom Fielder, Airline Strike Ends, with Clinton's Nudge American's Chief
Agrees to Arbitration, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 23, 1993, at lA (reporting that with two phone
calls to American Airlines Chairman Robert Crandall, the President settled a strike in which the
employer threatened to hire replacements for 21,000 flight attendants).
34° See Jonathan Gaw, OSHA Action Brings Closure of Tire Plant, 350 Dayton Tire Co. Employees
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United Rubber Workers went out on strike against the same firm
and were permanently replaced, the Secretary sought a meeting with
Bridgestone/Firestone's CEO, but his overture was rebuffed. 34 ' As this
transpired, the President became involved in a replacement strike
involving the professional baseball players and proposed unprecedented
legislation 342 to settle the strike by requiring the parties to submit to an
arbitration panel that he would select. 343
2. Elements of Executive Order 12,954
The executive order sets forth a procedure empowering the De-
partment of Labor to take measures to debar certain federal contrac-
tors who hire permanent striker replacements. The process begins
when the department investigates whether a covered employer has
permanently replaced lawfully striking workers.344 Its jurisdiction is
established by a contract between the Government as buyer and a seller
who furnishes supplies or services (including construction), involving
job orders, task orders, letter contracts, and orders such as purchase
orders.345 The minimum contract threshold is $100,000. 346
Upon finding that a contractor has hired permanent striker re-
placements, the agency may make a finding to terminate the contract
for convenience. 347 To accomplish this, the department must transmit
its finding to the head of any department or agency that contracts with
the employer. 348 Termination of the contract is not automatic, however,
because the contracting agency is permitted to challenge this determi-
nation.349 If the affected agency does not object, the labor department
Sent Home in Oklahoma City, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 19, 1994, at IC. Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich personally delivered an OSHA citation to a tire factory at which a worker was killed by a
machine that crushed his head. Id. At the factory gates, Reich fumed: "I came to Oklahoma City
today to personally deliver these citations because I find this case particularly outrageous and the
action of Bridgestone/Firestone offensive and unjustifiable." Id.
541 Clinton in Illinois, Touts His Proposals on Job Training, Tax Breaks, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
11, 1995, at 7.
342 See supra note 110.
343 See Swoboda, supra note 337,
344 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.11 (1995).
5451d. § 270.1(c) (1995).
346 M. § 270.2(c) (1995).
347 1d. § 270.14(a) (1995).
345 1d. § 270.15(b) (1995).
349 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.14(c) (1995). Although the order says no more
about this, it is conceivable that the contracting agency, for example, the Department of Defense,
would present evidence showing that no immediate or suitable substitute could be found to
replace the affected contractor, and that debarment would pose a risk to national security.
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may finalize the debarment process, thereby making the contractor
ineligible to receive government contracts."°
The order also contains significant and unusual limits not found
in other employment orders having a debarment sanction. Reflecting
recent replacement strikes involving large employers with numerous
subsidiaries,35 ' the order limits its sanction to the organizational unit of
a federal contractor that permanently replaces lawfully striking work-
ers.352
 In addition, the order has an ironic limitation: debarment is
temporary, lasting no longer than the underlying labor dispute."'
Nothing in the order requires an employer to dismiss permanent
replacements, and it is not unusual for settlements of these particular
strikes to include provisions for continuing the employment of replace-
ments. 354
 Like other orders providing debarment, Executive Order
12,954 provides targeted employers procedural due process.'"
Like other presidential employment orders having broad eco-
nomic policy goals356
 or a political motivation,357
 this order is based on
the FPASA. The order was justified on the grounds that hiring perma-
nent striker replacements is inconsistent with the "economical and
efficient administration and completion of contracts." 356 The Admini-
stration explained, "In order to operate as effectively as possible, by
receiving timely goods and services, the Federal Government must
assist the entities with which it has contractual relations to develop
stable relationships with their employees."'"
350 Id. § 270.15(c) (1995).
351 See Solar Turbines, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 660 (1991) (involving a replacement strike at a
Caterpillar subsidiary).
352
 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.12(b) (1995).
353 1d. § 270.15(b) (2).
354
 See Curtis Industries Walkout to End, supra note 321, at A-6 (providing for retention of
some striker replacements); A.T. Massey, supra note 295.
355
 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.12(d) (1995) (requiring the agency to notify the
employer of a proposed debarment and to provide the employer 15 days to respond in person,
or in writing, or through a representative).
356 See supra notes 247-54 and accompanying text (discussing Exec. Order No. 12,092).
357 See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text (discussing Exec. Order No. 12,818),
353
 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.11 (1995).
359
 President Clinton's Executive Order Sanctioning Federal Contractors That Hire Permanent
Striker Replacements, Daily Lab. Rep. (IiNA) No. 46, at E-2 (Mar. 9, 1995). The policy statement
continued:
An important aspect of a stable collective bargaining relationship is the balance
between allowing businesses to operate during a strike and preserving worker rights.
This balance is disrupted when permanent replacement employees are hired. It has
been found that strikes involving permanent replacement workers are longer in
duration than other strikes. In addition, the use of permanent replacements can
change a limited dispute into a broader, more contentious struggle, thereby exac-
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The Administration downplayed the likelihood of enforcing the
order often. It estimated that in 1994, 454 employers were affected by
strikes but only thirty hired replacements, and among these, only "a
small handful" involved federal contractors.°° The first list of contrac-
tors targeted for investigation included Bridgestone/Firestone, Pirelli
Spa of Italy and Pirelli Armstrong, Mosier, Inc., and Cook Family
Foods.s" 1
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,954
Employers immediately denounced Clinton's orders" and attacked
it on two fronts. At their urging, Republicans in Congress immediately
introduced legislation to block the order. This included efforts to
attach an override of the order to spending bills, 36s and more generally,
to achieve the same result through a bill introduced in the House
Economic and Educational Opportunities Committee . 36'1 In addition,
the Chamber of Commerce and other plaintiffs sued to enjoin the
erbating the problems that initially led to the strike. By permanently replacing its
workers, an employer loses the accumulated knowledge, experience, skill, and
expertise of its incumbent employees. These circumstances then adversely affect
the businesses and entities, such as the Federal Government, which rely on that
employer to provide high quality and reliable goods or services.
Id. (policy statement),
"3° Billings & Simendinger, supra note 25, at AA-1.
"I Teamsters Say Diamond Walnut Should Be Sanctioned, supra note 23, at D5.
"2 For example, Dan Barney, senior vice president for the American Trucking Association,
said the mere issuance of the order would have a chilling effect on employers during contract
negotiations because the order takes "away a tool that has been a counterweight." Billings, Striker
Replacements, supra note 11, at AA-1. He predicted the order will lead to more strikes and
inflationary wage agreements. Id. Quentin Riegel, attorney for the National Association of Manu-
facturers, said the order will give unions a "double-barreled" reason for targeting federal contrac-
tors who are not unionized, because the order gives more protection to employees who would
otherwise fear going out on strike and losing their jobs to permanent replacements. Id,
363 Republicans attached the defense department's appropriations bill to a supplemental bill,
H.R. 889, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), barring use of any funds for the current fiscal year to
implement or enforce Executive Order 12,954. Proponents of Clinton Executive Order Voice Opti-
mism on Legislative Showdown, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at AA-1 (Mar. 13, 1995). The House
bill passed. Clinton Administration Seeks Dismissal of Challenge to Striker Executive Order, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at AA-1 (Apr. 5, 1995). The Senate version, however, was defeated by a narrow
margin after Democrats threatened to a filibuster. Billings, Striker Replacements, supra note 11, at
AA-1. But this setback was only temporary since Republican leaders promised to add this override
in a future conference committee budget bill. Sen. Trent Lott (R., Miss.) said that the override
would be tied to disaster relief funding appropriated for California. Senate Spending Cut Package
Will not Include Ban on Striker Replacement Order, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A - l9 (Mar.
24, 1995).
II" Rep. William Goodling introduced H.R. 1176, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), a bill to
nullify the order, the same day the order was issued. Clinton Administration Seeks Dismissal of
Challenge to Striker Executive Order, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at AA-1 (Apr. 15, 1995). The
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order on constitutional grounds, and a group of lawmakers separately
sued, claiming that their constitutional powers had been usurped. 365
This multipronged attack against an executive order affecting
employment is unprecedented. Congressional efforts to override the
order, however, appear to raise no constitutional issues' 66
 for two rea-
sons. Because Clinton's order derives from a broad delegation of leg-
islative power, Congress has power to restrict that delegation or revoke
an application of it. Moreover, Executive Order 12,954 is unlike certain
orders regulating defense contractors only for a military purpose, and
therefore does not implicate the President's Article II power as Com-
mander in Chief.
The order could be voided in a less confrontational way, with
election of a president who chooses not to enforce it or even to rescind
it. Given that several Republican presidential candidates have made
public their opposition to any curbing of the Mackay Radio doctrine,367
this is more than an abstract possibility. In the long-run, then, the order
appears unlikely to effect the kind of long-term change in private
employment practices as have nondiscrimination orders.
This controversy is vitally important because of what is more likely
to happen in the meantime. Courts will decide its constitutionality and,
in doing so, will be put in an extraordinary position to define the
modern contours of executive lawmaking powers. These courts must
understand that they are deciding more than the appropriateness of a
striker-replacement ban to achieve certain government procurement
goals. If they strike down the order, they will make presidential efforts
to regulate private employment through the medium of federal con-
tracting more difficult. In short, they will likely establish a precedent
for mounting successful attacks on policies as far-ranging as race dis-
crimination and wage and price controls because Clinton's order is so
closely related to executive orders that have regulated these subjects.
The lengthy evidence presented in this Article showing the conceptual
relatedness of Executive Order 12,954 to two broad classes of presiden-
tial orders affecting private employment suggests that try as they might
bill was approved on a 22-16 vote by the House Economics and Educational Opportunities
Committee in June 1995. House Committee Moves to Nullify, supra note 17, at AA-1.
365
 See Judge Blocks Suit by Five Congressmen Challenging Striker Replacement Order, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 119, at AA-1 (June 21, 1995) (reporting that Doolittle v. Clinton, No. 95-874
(D.D.C.) was dismissed on June 21, 1995).
366 Accord id. (Judge Gladys Kessler declared "democratically elected members of Congress
should be deciding [this issue], rather than the courts").
347 See Billings, Striker Replacements, supra note 11 (reporting statements of Sen. Dole).
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to narrow their holding in this case, courts would find it very difficult
to craft a decision that would have limited precedential value.
A. The Order Does Not Violate the Separation
-of-Powers Doctrine
Employers contend that Executive Order 12,954 is unconstitu-
tional because it amounts to presidential lawmaking. In their view, no
president has authority to issue an executive order that conflicts with
the will of Congress. 368
 Applying this principle, they contend that Ex-
ecutive Order 12,954 resulted from impermissible lawmaking because
it violates the will of Congress, expressed when the striker-replacement
bill failed in the Senate in July 1994. 369 This argument fails on three
grounds.
First, this separation-of-powers argument erroneously interprets
the will of Congress by ignoring the fact that a majority of lawmakers
in the 103d Congress voted on the record to approve this legislation
and were thwarted by forty-seven senators who supported a motion to
filibuster the bill. 370
 This unusual legislative outcome—majority sup-
port on recorded votes in the Senate and House, defeated by a threat-
ened filibuster—must be interpreted as an ambiguous rather than
a negative expression of congressional will. Since Executive Order
12,954 neither conflicts nor comports with congressional intent, it falls
into Justice Jackson's middle-ground of uses of presidential power. 37 '
'68 Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-49, E-50. The complaint stated that
the order:
contravenes the will of Congress expressed in the Labor Management Relations Act,
which is the NLRB's enabling legislation. Congress gave the NLRB exclusive juris-
diction to administer and enforce the NLRA. In doing so, the intent of Congress
was plainly to deny the President any role in regulating labor-management relations
under the NLRA beyond nominating NLRB Members and proposing, signing, or
vetoing labor legislation. The Order contradicts the unambiguous intent of Con-
gress inherent in the creation of the NLRB, however, by regulating labor-manage-
ment relations under the NLRA.
Id. (citations omitted). It must be noted that this argument points to no authority indicating that
Congress intended to foreclose all presidential regulation of private-sector collective bargaining.
If Congress intended this, the Kahn court was not presented with this argument. That court ruled
that President Carter's wage and price controls affecting collective bargaining were not unlawful.
See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S, 915 (1979).
369
 See Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-45. The complaint observes,
"Numerous legislative attempts have been made over the years to eliminate the practice of hiring
permanent replacements, most recently last year when the current administration introduced
legislation to overturn Mackay Radio. Not one of the anti-replacement bills, however, was en-
acted." Id.
570 See Senate Vote Fails, supra note 335.
" 1 See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
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Second, this employer argument fails to make a necessary distinc-
don between the Workplace Fairness Act's absolute and general pro-
hibition on hiring striker replacements and Executive Order 12,954's
much more limited and conditional application. In short, Congress
considered imposing a general ban on employer hiring of permanent
striker replacements under the Workplace Fairness Act, whereas the
Clinton Administration determined that the same principle, when
applied to the much smaller group of federal contractors, serves valid
government procurement interests.
Executive Order 12,954 has no bearing on roughly eighty percent
of employers who have no federal contracts, or whose contracts are less
than the order's $100,000 threshold."2 Moreover, a regulated employer
does not lose its Mackay Radio rights, as employers contend. Rather,
they are presented a cost-benefit choice. They must choose whether to
forego the cost-savings achieved by hiring permanent striker replace-
ments or lose their federal contracts.
Employers allege that this is a Hobson's choice, but their argu-
ment is exaggerated. Bridgestone/Firestone, now at risk of losing a $12
million government contract, had 1994 sales of $5.67 billion."' Thus,
Executive Order 12,954 presents Bridgestone/Firestone this financial
choice: whether it should dismiss approximately 2300 permanent re-
placements while returning former strikers who are now awaiting Laid-
law reinstatement,"4 or lose its twelve million dollar contract, which
represents .002% of its total sales. Diamond Walnut, another targeted
contractor, stands to lose a one million dollar school lunch contract,
but had record sales in 1993 of $204 million."' Thus, the largest
worldwide producer of walnuts" 6 is risking less than one percent of its
total sales if it does not settle its continuing labor dispute.
. In sum, employer arguments do not reflect the economic realities
of the debarment proceedings about to commence. The amount of
government contracts for employers who hire permanent striker re-
placements is a pittance of total sales. In other words, the financial
impact of this government regulation is close to nil. And this fact has
372 See Nornani, supra note 261.
373 See Business Briefs, supra note 259.
374 See Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970) (providing that replaced strikers remain employees who are entitled to full reinstatement
upon the departure of replacements).
375 Mark Arax, Strikers Reap Harvest of Bitterness, L.A. TISIEs, May 10, 1994, at 3 (reporting
that sales growth occurred while the company cut wages $146 million over a three-year period).
More recent sales figures could not be Found.
376 Peter Kilburn, The Party's Over at Diamond Walnut, SAN DIEGO UNION & Tale., Apr. 24,
1994, at C7.
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constitutional significance because Executive Order 12,954's impact on
the economy appears to be close to zero.
Third, the separation-of-powers argument ignores the historical
development of executive power exercised to promote policies op-
posed by Congress. The contrast between Eisenhower's orders to de-
segregate contractors' workplaces and Congress's general opposition
to desegregation underscores this point.
No branch of the federal government in the 1950s was more
hostile to the principle of integrating African Americans than Con-
gress. Federal district judges were often the only public actors in the
South to act against segregation. 377
 Certainly, they were motivated by a
series of Supreme Court rulings invalidating segregationist practices."
Although he was sharply criticized for being weak on civil rights,
Eisenhower nevertheless strengthened affirmative action provisions for
federal contractors and ordered federal troops into Little Rock, Arkan-
sas to enforce a court order requiring desegregation of schools.
Congress, in contrast, was the last branch to do something to end
segregation, and its 1957 legislation was limited compared to Brown v.
Board of Education and Eisenhower's executive orders." Throughout
this pivotal decade, Congress was manifestly hostile to the concept of
desegregation.
Ninety-six lawmakers signed a manifesto, the Declaration of Con-
stitutional Principles, calling for "all lawful means" to resist integra-
tion. 38° They sharply criticized the Supreme Court for its landmark
desegregation ruling, stating, "This unwarranted exercise of power by
the court, contrary to the Constitution . . . is destroying the amicable
377 See 	 PELTAsori, FIVIT-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1971).
378 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (invalidating state law designed to discourage
associational rights by requiring the NAACP to reveal names and addresses of its members and
agents); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. i (1958) (rejecting arguments that state and local officials
have no duty to comply with federal desegregation orders); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955) (per curiam) (invalidating city ordinance restricting certain golf courses and parks
to whites); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiain)
(invalidating segregated beaches and bathhouses); Muir v. Louisville Park Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971
(1954) (per curiam) (ruling that a private association leasing a public facility has no right to
discriminate on the basis of race); Brown v. Board of' Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling
separate-hut-equal doctrine in provision of education); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(invalidating a South Carolina practice permitting a local, white association from controlling the
state's primary elections, thereby disenfranchising African-American voters).
37 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957) (securing the right to
vote for African Americans and establishing a federal civil rights commission). This act passed
three years after the Supreme Curt acted in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38°Alvin Schuster, 96 in Congress Open Drive to Upset Integration Ruling N.Y. TIMES, Mar, 12,
1956, at 1.
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relations between the white and Negro races that have been created
through ninety years of patient effort by people of both races." 8 ' While
the President and most federal judges understood that the end of the
Jim Crow era was at hand, this large segment of Congress argued for
returning to Plessy v. Ferguson's separate-but-equal doctrine. 382
The Congressional Record from this period shows congressmen
rationalizing the status quo. 883 Debate on the 1957 Civil Rights Act elicited
a range of segregationist arguments in the Congress. 384 As if to empha-
size congressional failure to respond to race issues, the 1960 United
"I Text of 96 Congressmen's Declaration on Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Mat 12, 1956, at 19
[hereinafter 96 Congressmen's Declaration].
582 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The 1956
declaration stated:
Though there has been no constitutional amendment or act of Congress changing
this established legal principle almost a century old, the Supreme Court of the
United States, with no legal basis, undertook to exercise their naked judicial power
and substituted their personal political and social ideas for the established law of
the land.
96 Congressmen's Declaration, supra note 381, at 19.
w Congressional opponents to desegregation argued that Southern Negroes saw no need
for this reform. For example, Georgia's Representative E.L. Forrester stated:
The price paid for the philosophies on this bill are too high. In order to appease
the leftwing groups in this country, our leaders integrated our Armed Forces. It
was a terrific price, for some day you will all learn that you cannot keep good men
in our Armed Forces when integration is practiced. These men refuse to adopt a
profession where they are made guinea pigs for social experiments that they know
are detrimental.
103 CONG. REC. 16,089 (daily ed, Aug. 27, 1957).
584 It was common to argue that this type of federal legislation was oppressive: "[T]flis
legislation will turn back the clock to the days of tyranny and despotism. Tyrants and despots
through the ages have sought to do by tyrannical fiat things no worse than this bill does by
legislative enactment." 103 CONG. Ri.c. 16,102 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1957) (statement of Rep. Flynt).
This legislation was also opposed on grounds that it violated states' rights:
Fri oday we are facing Armageddon. If we pass this so-called civil rights bill we are
at the point of no return. We are relinquishing the last vestige of States rights and
are saying to the mythical Great White Father in Washington, "We expect you now
to solve all of our problems including local law enforcement"
Id. at 16,105 (statement of Rep. Matthews). Another view held that progress was being made
without legislation, and laws would actually aggravate race problems:
Progress is being made in my State and in other States in the South. People of good
will in both races have been doing great work toward better race relations; however,
I must confess that such legislation as this is causing suspicion and distrust where
it did not exist before.
Id. at 16,101-02 (statement of Rep. Grant). Other opponents argued that the legislation was too
advanced given American customs and mores:
This [legislation] does not contemplate the fact that in many areas of our country
the courthouses are not equipped for both men and women. in many areas the
hotels are not equipped, nor willing, to serve both races at the same table and both
races realize the realities of this situation.
Id. at 16,104 (statement of Rep. Hemphill).
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States Civil Rights Commission implied that the executive ranch was
better equipped than the Congress to enact necessary reforms. 355
This history is relevant to Executive Order 12,954 because the
Chamber of Commerce contends that Justice Black's view of separa-
tion-of-powers in Youngstown should be applied to invalidate this or-
der.s8" By this reasoning, Eisenhower's orders desegregating the work-
places of federal contractors were unconstitutional. Clearly, Congress
in the 1950s was more hostile to the goals behind Eisenhower's execu-
tive orders than the last Congress was opposed to the principle of
banning permanent striker replacements. By increasing pressure on
federal contractors to end discriminatory practices, Eisenhower made
law no less than Clinton did in Executive Order 12,954. But no one
argues today that Eisenhower's orders were unconstitutional.
It follows, therefore, that the constitutionality of an executive
order is not determined by its popularity with Congress, But this
popularity test is precisely the kind of simple equation that the Cham-
ber of Commerce is suggesting in its separation-of-powers argument.
Experience shows that a president's control over federal contracting
can promote broad policy goals that Congress opposes. If the President
has acted against the will of Congress, it remains to that body, and not
the courts, to restrict or repeal an offensive executive order.
B. Executive Order 12,954 Is a Valid Exercise of Executive Power
Delegated by Congress Under FPASA
The Chamber of Commerce contends that Executive Order 12,954
cannot be sustained under the FPASA because that statute "does not
A South Carolina congressman's opposition cut through the veneer of respectable-sounding
arguments on government powers:
The native southerner for generations has borne a major burden. He has been
responsible for tutoring and nurturing a completely dissimilar race. In the light of
all history, we all must admit that he has done his job well. . . There were times
when he was tempted to move away and start life anew where there was no race
problem. To his everlasting credit, let it be said that he stayed there through
adversity, poverty and occupation and brought the minority race a standard of living
and a civilization that this race has never known anywhere else in the world.
Id. at 16,096 (statement of Rep. Dorn).
585 Its first policy recommendation stated, "Pi he Federal Government, either by executive
or, if necessary, by congressional action; [should] take such measures as may be required to assure
that funds . are disbursed only to such publicly controlled institutions of higher education as
do not discriminate on grounds of race ...." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAWS IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 267 (1960).
9A1 See Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-47 (stating, "In a leading case
involving the separation of powers, the Supreme Court held that the President's authority to issue
an Executive Order 'must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.'").
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authorize the President to issue orders that are contrary to other
federal statutes."'" This is a strawman argument because few if any laws
grant presidents authority to issue orders that negate other laws. The
employers' argument here is simply another way of restating their main
contention that Clinton's order is contrary to the Mackay Radio doc-
trine under the NLRA.
In addition, the Chamber's argument is uninformed in a crucial
respect: most executive orders affecting private employment have cited
no statutory authority. In light of this history, the Chamber's argumenta-
tive statement that the "order cites but one statute as authority" is silly.
Moreover, the Chamber fails to consider the FPASA's special dele-
gation of power to the President. The Kahn court carefully reviewed
the history of this law and concluded that even though Congress meant
for the President to be guided by considerations of economy and
efficiency in making procurement policies, it granted broad discretion
in arriving at these policies."'
This is not to say that sham justifications for procurement policies
can satisfy the FPASA's grant of authority. While the President has
flexibility in determining how to achieve economy and efficiency, the
Kahn court stated that there must be "a sufficiently close nexus" be-
tween these considerations and the procurement program established
by an order."89
The Chamber contends that Clinton's order fails this rational
nexus test, 39° and erroneously argues that to invoke the FPASA, "the
President was obligated to make explicit findings against which judicial
review of the lawfulness of his actions can be judged.""' This is erro-
neous not only because the Administration published these findings
in announcing the order, 392 but also because the FPASA does not
587 Id.
488 See supra notes 250-253 and accompanying text.
389 See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
59° Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-48.
391 Id. There is no such requirement under the FPASA or any other law. This contention
stands on an assertion by the Kahn court that "otherwise, the FPASA would essentially 'write a
blank check for the President to fill in at his will.'" Id. (quoting Kahn, 6l8 F.2d at 793).
4U2 As the Administration announced the order on March 8, 1995, the Department of Labor
stated its factual justification for it. See Labor Department Information Sheet on Clinton Executive
Order, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46 at E-3 (Mar. 9, 1995). The Department stated:
The firing of the PATCO strikers in 1981 set off a series of destructive strikes and
permanent replacement of strikers at Greyhound, International Paper, Continental
Airlines, and other companies, and it killed Eastern Airlines after a long, bitter
strike.
Since the economical and efficient administration and completion of federal
government contracts requires a stable and productive labor-management environ-
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impose such a fact-finding duty on the President. Ironically, the Cham-
ber made its fact-finding argument before the Administration had time
to complete its solicitation of public comment pursuant to publishing
its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 3"
Aside from these procedural points, there is a rational nexus
between the order's ban on hiring of permanent striker replacements
and government procurement interests. This Article presents addi-
tional support for this connection in two forms. It reviews permanent
replacement strikes involving employers who currently or recently were
government contractors and explains how these strikes potentially
impaired production or delivery of government goods, and it presents
new evidence from my research on replacement strikes showing that
these strikes are lasting longer than replacement strikes in any other
period since 1935.
1. The Potential for Impairing Production or Delivery of
Government Purchases
A review of several recent replacement strikes shows that Executive
Order 12,954 meets the Kahn court's rational nexus test. Some of these
strikes have been violent and unusually disruptive and also have in-
volved products, such as guns, coal, copper, and packaged meats,
procured by the federal government. Based on this evidence, one can
reasonably presume that product quality or delivery would be compro-
mised by such strikes, to the detriment of the government as purchaser.
When George A. Hormel, a large meatpacker, hired more than
1000 permanent striker replacements, its facility in Austin, Minnesota
was besieged by riot. 394
 As the strike continued, anonymous callers
contacted Minneapolis stores to report that Hormel products had been
sabotaged. 395
 If Hormel had been a federal food contractor supplying
schools396
 or the military during this period, one can reasonably imag-
ment, the federal government has a strong interest in its role as a purchaser of
goods and services in prohibiting the use of permanent replacements. The use of
replacement workers affects efficiency and economical production in several ways:
Research has found that strikes involving permanent replacements last seven times
longer than strikes that don't involve permanent replacements.
Id.
5"3 The Chamber's suit is dated March 15, two days after the order was announced in the
Federal Register, and before the Administration's publication of its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
on March 27, 1995.
594 Serrin, Hormel Opens Plant, supra note 282, at 12.
335jail Sentences of 2 Iltrrmel Strikers Stayed, Cm. Titus., Feb. 5, 1986, at 4,
"6 cf, Teamsters Say Diamond Walnut Should Be Sanctioned, supra note 23.
292	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol 37:229
ine these institutions would have treated these calls seriously. There
likely would have been expense in checking to make sure that sabotage
did not occur, and there can be little doubt that some end-users would
lose confidence in these products. The federal government would have
had a legitimate product-quality interest in procuring unquestionably
safe food for soldiers and school children to eat.
When the Pittston Coal Group hired 1700 permanent replace-
ments, 397 strikers disrupted production by forcibly seizing a preparation
plant."8 They also engaged in mass demonstrations blocking access to
mines and processing plants, set jackrocks on public highways to punc-
ture tires on trucks delivering Pittston coal, and organized slow convoys
ahead of such trucks in mountain roads where passing is difficult
under ordinary conditions. 388 If Pittston had been a federal contrac-
tor—supplying, for example, a military base that operated its own
power generator—it is reasonable to suppose that these strike-related
disruptions would have posed problems for the efficient operation of
such a plant.
After Colt Industries, the main supplier of M-16 assault rifles for
the United States Army, 48° hired permanent replacements, its strike
lasted more than forty-three months. Mass picketing blocked entrances
to Colt plants and led to disorderly conduct, including vandalism and
rock-throwing.40 ' It is reasonable to suppose that the Army would have
concerns about the quality and timely delivery of M-16s manufactured
and shipped under these conditions.
In short, while the FPASA does not require the President to prove
a justification for his procurement policies, neither does it permit him
to make arbitrary assumptions about how these policies serve the
federal government. Evidence presented here shows that the govern-
ment has a reasonable basis to support its concern about the quality
and timely delivery of purchases from contractors who hire permanent
striker replacements.
In this vein, it should also be noted that Clinton's order does not
necessarily benefit unions and their members. One possible outcome
397 Proposed Settlement of Charges in Pittston Strike Agreed to by NLRB, Mine Workers, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at A -5, A-6 (Feb. 12, 1990).
399 Federal Judge Holds UMW in Contempt for Occupation of Pittston Facility, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 182, at A-8 (Sept. 21, 1989).
3" United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 244 Va. 263, 267-70 (1993), reo'd, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2553
(1994).
• 499 Christianson v. Colt Indus., Inc., 486 U.S. 800, 804 (1988).
491 NLRB Administrative Law Judge Finds Colt Strike Caused by Unfair Labor Practice, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 177, at A-11, A-12 (Sept. 14, 1989).
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under the order is to divert government purchasing to nonunion
suppliers who are unaffected by a strike: 1°2 This observation is impor-
tant because it underscores that the order places economic and efficient
contract administration ahead of the betterment of unions and their
members. The Chamber of Commerce overlooks this possibility by
suggesting that the order would always benefit unions. 4°3
2. Fighting the Trend Toward Longer Strikes
The Administration also expressed concern that strikes involving
permanent replacements are lengthy disputes and, therefore, raise
doubts about contractors' abilities to deliver goods and services as
promised. The employers' lawsuit questioned this part of the order,
stating that it lacked substantiation. 4°4 This is a dubious argument,
however, because not one of the 113 executive orders appearing in this
Article expressly incorporated an economic or sociological research
finding. 405 In fact, earlier executive orders made certain labor market
assumptions that some economists would strongly challenge:106 This
argument, therefore, imposes an unprecedented requirement on Ex-
ecutive Order 12,954.
There is statistical evidence, albeit limited, supporting the order's
premises. Professors John Schnell and Cynthia Gramm expanded a
study performed by the Government Accounting Office on strikes
4°2 See Exec. Order No. 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,713 (1992) (providing for open bidding to
nonunion, as well as unionized, contractors).
4" See Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-48 (stating that "111 or many years
federal contracting agencies have been required to remain impartial concerning any dispute
between labor and management").
444 Id.
405 Cf. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941) (citing "evidence that available and
needed workers have been barred from employment in industries engaged in defense production
solely because of considerations of race, creed, color, or national origin, to the detriment of
workers' morale and of national unity"). But Roosevelt's order contained no citation to actual
studies, or other authorities, to support this general claim. See id.
400 Cf. Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943) (creating a new Committee on Fair
Employment Practice in the belief that such a committee would "promote the fullest utilization
of all available manpower, and [would] eliminate discriminatory employment practices"); CARY
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 57-58 (1971). Becker states:
Many serious errors have been committed because of a failure to recognize that
market segregation and market discrimination are separate concepts referring to
separate phenomena. Market discrimination refers to the incomes received by
different groups and ignores their distribution in employment; market segregation
refers to their distribution in employment and ignores their incomes. Market segrega-
tion can occur without market discrimination ...; market discrimination can occur
without market segregation ... and quite often they occur together.
BECKER, supra, at 57-58.
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occurring in 1985 and 1989, and concluded that "strikes are longer .. .
when the employer hires permanent replacements than when the
employer does not ... [and] simply announcing the intent to perma-
nently replace strikers is associated with longer strikes."407
In the absence of any government compilation of statistics about
replacement strikes from 1935 through the present, I have developed
a database of these strikes as reported in NLRB and federal court
decisions. My research 408
 differs from Schnell and Gramm's because
they compared duration of replacement strikes to ordinary strikes
(where no replacements are hired); and their data, although more
detailed than mine, covered only two years. My data not only come
exclusively from replacement strikes, and therefore offer no compari-
son to nonreplacement strikes, but also cover a fifty-seven-year period.
This information is relevant because it provides additional empiri-
cal support for the order's premise that replacement strikes are lasting
longer. In addition, this evidence is new in the sense that no other
research compares strike duration within the class of strikes involving
permanent striker replacements.
My research shows that replacement strike duration has been
steadily increasing since 1960. From 1960-1969, average (mean) dura-
tion was 121 days, but increased to 155 days from 1970-1979, and then
sharply increased during 1980-1992 to 229 days.
These results are significant in several respects. If, in fact, replace-
ment strikes lasted only several days, or at the most a few weeks, there
would be more room to argue that Executive Order 12,954 exaggerates
the potential harm to government procurement interests. But since
these disputes are not resolved quickly, they indicate that the govern-
ment's exposure to strike-related disorder during unsettled replace-
ment strikes is substantial. The data do not establish that product
quality and timely delivery problems resulted from these strikes, since
these variables could not be measured. But the finding for the most
recent period, when read in conjunction with the various replacement
strikes in the 1980s in which violence and disorder occurred, 409 adds
to the Clinton Administration's assertion that these strikes pose legiti-
mate concerns for a purchaser.
4°7 John F. Schnell & Cynthia L. Gramm, The Empirical Relations Between Employers' Striker
Replacement Strategies and Strike Duration, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 189,199 (1994).
408 For more information about this study's research methodology, see LeRoy, supra note 278,
at 182-84; and LeRoy, supra note 274, at 39-43, Invariably, there is a lengthy lag between the
date a replacement strike begins and the date it is adjudicated by the NLRB or a federal court.
Hence, strikes most recently reported began in the early 1990s or late 1980s. This accounts for
the fact that 1992 is the most recent strike-initiation year in my sample.
409 See supra notes 282-320 and accompanying text,
March 1996]	 EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,959
	 295
In addition, the results indicate a growing problem that merits the
attention of the federal government, as a procurer of goods and serv-
ices, and also as enforcer of a national policy to promote peaceful labor
dispute settlements. My research shows that replacement strike dura-
don decreased until the 1960s, when the current upward trend began.
That trend has been consistent and is clearly at odds with the national
public policy of promoting settlement of labor-management disputes.'''
The Chamber of Commerce speciously contends that Executive
Order 12,954 tilts the balance of bargaining power in these disputes
and biases the government's role in favor of unions. 4 " But there are
many weapons in an employer's strike-response arsenal, including hir-
ing temporary replacements, that Executive Order 12,954 does not
regulate; and firms have actually increased profits while employing
temporary replacemen ts.a' 2
 Furthermore, the employers' suit offers no
evidence to support this sweeping assertion.
It is possible, however, that the order will hasten some negotiations
and thus promote more expeditious strike settlements. Just as employ-
ers overstate the argument that Executive Order 12,954 improperly
interferes with free collective bargaining, the Administration probably
overstates the order's ability to promote settlements. In reality, this
would tend to occur only when an employer depended on government
contracts to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, considering that some
replacement strikes now last several years, 413
 this part of the order has
a legitimate objective. Thus, the order is likely to further two govern-
ment interests: diminishing its currently long exposure to potentially
disruptive strikes, and fostering more expeditious strike settlements.
C. Clinton's Use of Executive Power Has Ample Precedent
In attacking the order, employers mention only two other execu-
tive orders affecting private employment:1 ' 4 These were probably the
most controversial and highly contested of all such orders. To mention
only these orders creates an erroneous impression that such orders are
extremely rare and are also suspect. Viewing the 113 employment
415 See 29 U.S.C. § I71(a) (1994) (stating, lilt is the policy of the United States that sound
and stable industrial peace and the advancement of the general welfare ... can most satisfactorily
be secured by the settlement of issues between employers and employees through the processes
of conference and collective bargaining").
Ott
	 Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-42.
412 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
413
 See, e.g., Curtis Industries Walkout to End, supra note 321, at A-5. (reporting settlement of
a replacement strike that lasted four years).
4 I 4 These are President Truman's Steel Seizure order (Exec. Order No. 10,340), and Presi-
dent Carter's wage and price control order (Exec. Order No. 12,092).
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orders examined here, this part of the employers' suit is uninformed
when it argues that Clinton's order lacks precedent. An overwhelming
majority of these orders were never subjected to a court challenge, and
when they were, they were upheld with rare exception.
The employer challenge to Executive Order 12,954 not only over-
looks these numerous uses of presidential power, but also fails to
account for the enormous accretion of this power in regulating private
employment since the 1940s. Clinton's order cannot be fairly judged
without comparing it to this history.
Executive Order 12,954 is not novel compared to orders regulat-
ing collective bargaining. It threatens contract debarment as its ulti-
mate sanction, just as two of Bush's orders did. 4 '' Obviously, Bush's
orders were directed against unions while Clinton's favors strikers, but
the validity of an executive order cannot depend on whom it benefits.
Moreover, the last order that significantly affected collective bargaining
was Carter's order capping wages that a union could negotiate. That
order expropriated the superior bargaining power of certain unions
who, without the order, would likely have negotiated better raises. In
addition, Carter's order affected all collective bargaining agreements,
while Executive Order 12,954 affects a much smaller fraction of bar-
gaining relationships involving a federal contract over $100,000. Nev-
ertheless, Carter's order, Executive Order 10,292, was upheld.
The debarment feature in Executive Order 12,954 is nothing new.
The same sanction can be found in several employment discrimination
orders.4' 6 What the Chamber of Commerce suit does not show is that
Clinton's order is milder than the EEO orders. It has no provision for
enforcement through an injunction,417 and contains no criminal pen-
alty.418 In addition, it defines employer noncompliance as a temporary
occurrence. 419
In sum, Clinton's order draws on ample precedent for presidential
intrusion in otherwise free collective bargaining and in prescribing
debarment as a penalty. Yet in its lawsuit, the Chamber of Commerce
compares this order to Truman's infamous Steel Seizure order. 42° The
dissimilarities in these orders are too great—one takes private property,
415 Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992); Exec. Order No. 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg.
48,713 (1992).
416 See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (first appearance of debarment
sanction).
4 ' 7 Id.
418 See id.
419 See supra note 353.
420 See Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E -47.
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and the other rescinds a procurement contract—to warrant a serious
comparison. 421
V. CONCLUSION
Executive Order 12,954 stands at the convergence of two consti-
tutional currents. One involves the President's power to manage fed-
eral contracts while pursuing a social or economic goal. Executive
Order 12,954 is modeled after scores of orders dating to World War II
that effectively regulated private employment by rewarding and pun-
ishing government contractors. The recent decision in Adarand Con-
structors v. Pena422 does not attack the original source of this powerful
tool of employment regulation, because Congress eventually enacted
legislation to conform with presidential orders requiring federal agen-
cies to administer affirmative action programs. But Adarand's effect is
to subject federal contracting programs incorporating certain affirma-
tive action principles, and enforced by contract debarment, 423 to strict
scrutiny. Adarand clearly means that courts will play a more active role
in reviewing federal contracting. Consequently, this increases the like-
lihood that courts will review a president's use of federal contracting
for other social or economic goals.
The second constitutional current involves the President's power
to use federal contracts to regulate private-sector collective bargaining
when the NLRA occupies this field. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich raises
important questions about this regulation.424 It characterizes Executive
Order 12,954 as a new law and challenges a presidential act that
appears at first glance to contradict Congress's recent rejection of a
similar measure.
Before striking down this order, a court should carefully consider
the following possible consequences.
421 Accord Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) (stating the well-established
presumption that the Government enjoys the unrestricted power .. to determine those with
whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed pur-
chases").
422 l 15 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
423 In 1994, these programs included: the Small Business Administration's $4.4 billion award
of federal contracts to 5400 minority-firms; the Defense Department's set-aside of $2.8 billion in
procurement contracts to minority contractors; the justice Department's expenditure of at least
10% of local law-enforcement grant funds on contracts to businesses owned by minorities or
females; the State Department's expenditure of at least 10% of contracts to build or guard
embassies to minority contractors; and the Department of Transportation's expenditure of at least
10% of a $151 billion budget on minority contractors. Paul M, Barrett, Supreme Court Ruling
Imperils U.S. Programs of Racial Preference, WALL ST. j.„June 13, 1995, at Al, A10 cols. 1-2),
424 57 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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First, the separation-of-powers argument likely to sustain such a
ruling is based on Justice Black's compartmentalized view of executive
power.425 His colleagues challenged this view because they thought it
underestimated the constitutional powers of the modern presidency.426
By Justice Black's reasoning, Congress would not have had power to
enact legislation taking custody of President Nixon's papers, 427 or to
delegate its power to define criminal sentences to a commission in the
judicial branch, 428 or to delegate legislative power to restrict the sale of
arms and munitions to other nations to the President, 42g because none
of these derived from an express constitutional power.
Second, overturning Executive Order 12,954 would effectively un-
dermine the basis for many of the 112 employment orders that stand
apart from the Steel Seizure order. In short, such a ruling would create
a precedent much broader than the Youngstown case for invalidating
other orders.
425 See Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 6, at E-47 (quoting Justice Black's Young-
stown statement that an executive order "'must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself'").
426 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Justice Frankfurter stated that "the considerations relevant to the legal enforcement
of the principle of separation of powers seem to me more complicated and flexible than may
appear from what Mr. Justice Black has written." Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Jackson's
concurrence rejected Black's functional approach by noting, "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government." Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Clark's concur-
rence implicitly rejected Black's static view of separation-of-powers when he stated: "The limits of
presidential power are obscure. However, Article II, no less than Article 1, is part of a constitution
intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs." Id. at 661 (Clark, J., concurring) (internal quote omitted). In contrast to Black's
static view, Clark viewed the Constitution as conferring fluid executive power that would increase
to its maximum during national emergencies:
In describing this authority 1 care not whether one calls it "residual," "inherent,"
"moral," "implied," "aggregate," "emergency," or otherwise.... [W]here Congress
has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the
President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis; but . . . in the
absence of such action by Congress, the President's independent power to act
depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation.
Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
427 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Writing for a 7-2 majority,
Justice Brennan noted that the Court had rejected the view that "the Constitution contemplates
a complete division of authority between the three branches" and instead adopted a "more
pragmatic, flexible approach." Id. at 442, 443.
428 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding Congress's delegation of
power to U.S. Sentencing Commission). Justice Blackmun's majority opinion observed that "our
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex
society, ... [Congress] simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives." Id. at 372.
429 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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In the employment arena, future presidents would have more
difficulty sustaining emergency wage and price control orders. Oppo-
nents would be more likely to prevail by arguing that very specific
legislation to deregulate sectors of the economy's° trumps a vague grant
of emergency economic powers delegated by Congress. Proper authori-
zation of the President would therefore require a detailed delegation
of power, but during such crises, Congress might be too fragmented
to agree on the scope and phrasing of this delegation. In short, the
strict constructionist logic embodied in the attack on Executive Order
12,954 would prevent Congress from expediently turning to the Presi-
dent to manage an economic crisis.
But the threat to presidential authority would probably extend
beyond employment regulation. For example, some executive orders,
including a recent one to improve fishing opportunities nationwide,
regulate the environment by citing Congress's general delegation of
authority."' Conceivably, this regulation would result in a controversial
agency action concerning use of water, resources. A ruling to overturn
Executive Order 12,954 based on the employer argument that Clinton
usurped a power reserved to Congress would put this environmental
regulation on more dubious footing.
Third, a successful attack on Executive Order 12,954 would have
significant implications for the present balance of power between the
coordinate branches of federal government. Clearly, federal judges
would be in a more commanding position to review, and possibly
overturn, presidential orders. Thus, a ruling against Executive Order
12,954 would increase the likelihood of a serious confrontation be-
tween the judicial and executive branches.
This Article shows that many presidential orders affecting private
employment have been highly controversial, but nevertheless have
been implemented without challenge. Many were unpopular and forced
unwanted change on institutions, customs, peoples, and individuals.
The exigencies of war explain some, but certainly not most of the
430 See, e.g., The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (deregulating freight-hauling prices).
431 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,962, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,769 (1995). Executive Order 12,962 cites
the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, and The Magnuson Fishery Conservation Act as authority for directing
federal agencies to take a series of actions to increase recreational fishing opportunities nation-
wide. See id. While the order states a goal to "improve the quantity, function, sustainable produc-
tivity, and distribution of U.S. aquatic resources," the means for achieving this is left to federal
agencies authorized here to develop a five-year plan; and while the order directs federal agencies
to cooperate with state, local, and tribal authorities, one can foresee a conflict among these
authorities in determining a water-use'policy. See id. In such a case, Executive Order 12,962 would
appear to stand on similar ground to Executive Order 12,954.
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nation's acquiescence. Ultimately, all but one were accepted because
the American public recognized that the Presidents who conceived
them were exercising a legitimate lawmaking power.
Fourth, an adverse ruling would undermine a constitutional power
that has enabled the nation to deal with explosive political issues. This
Article shows a succession of presidents, Democrats and Republicans,
who issued employment discrimination orders to fill a void created by
numerous Congresses indisposed to deal with mounting race-segrega-
tion problems. They invoked a moral tone reminiscent of Lincoln's
controversial exercise of power to defeat slavery. 452
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and Roosevelt's Executive
Order 8802 are kindred orders. Stripped to its essentials, Lincoln's proc-
lamation legislated slavery out of existence" No one can reasonably
argue that this was not a usurpation of legislative powers; Congress had
been deadlocked for years in legislating this matter.'' 4 More than that,
Lincoln's fiat violated the Constitution, 435 because that document insti-
tutionalized slavery. 436
432 Compare The Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268, 1269 (1863), reprinted in Docu-
MENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 420-21 (Henry Steele Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 1988)
(concluding "Mind upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the
Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the
gracious favor of Almighty God") with Exec. Order No. 10,479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4800 (1953) (stating
that it is the policy of the United States Government to promote equal employment opportunity
for all qualified persons employed or seeking employment on government contracts because such
persons are entitled to fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of employment").
433 See The Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268, 1269 (1863) (1 recommend to them
that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages."), reprinted in Docu-
MENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 432, at 420-21.
See, e.g., DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 432, at 319 (discussing Sen.
Henry Clay's resolution of Jan. 29, 1850, resulting in the Compromise of 1850, U.S. Senate
Journal, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 118 ff).
435 See Mark E. Neely Jr., Emancipation Proclamation, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 551 (Leonard W. Levy & Louis Fisher eds., 1994) (stating: "The proclamation was a
presidential order freeing the slaves in areas of rebellion against the United States."). Ironically,
Lincoln revoked General Fremont's freeing of slaves in Missouri in 1861, and remarked: "Can it
be pretended that it is any longer the government of the U.S.—any government of Constitution
and laws,—wherein a General, or a President, may make permanent rules of property by procla-
mation?" Id. Also see the ironic resolution of the Illinois legislature, condemning the proclama-
tion on constitutional grounds:
Resolved: That the emancipation proclamation of the President of the United States
is as unwarrantable in military as in civil law; a gigantic usurpation, at once con-
verting the war, professedly commenced by the administration for the vindication
of the authority of the constitution, into a crusade for the sudden, unconditional
and violent liberation of 3,000,000 Negro slaves.
Resolution of Illinois State Legislature, reported in hanvois STATE REctsTER, Jan. 7, 1863, reprinted
in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 432, at 422.
43t The full passage reads:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,
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Like Lincoln's edict, Roosevelt's acted on an untouchable race issue.
Not only did it lack congressional authorization; it ran against a deep
grain in the nation. That part of Roosevelt's order equating a successful
war effort with integrating private workplaces compares to Lincoln's
explicit direction that Union forces admit freed slaves into their ranks. 437
Even if changing political customs and experience brought on by
a civil war, a world war, and a cold war account for much of this
accretion of executive lawmaking, it is also true that the framers of the
Constitution, and their inspirational theoretician, anticipated that the
President would exercise this power. John Locke's Second Treatise of
Civil Government was emulated by the framers. 438 While Locke viewed
legislative power as supreme, and executive power as subordinate to it,
paradoxically he believed that "the good of society requires that sev-
eral things should be left to the discretion of him that has executive
power"439 and "this power to act according to the discretion for the
public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it, is that which is called prerogative." 440 He elaborated by
describing prerogative as a trust characterized by "an arbitrary power
in some things left in the prince's hand" provided that it is used "to
do good, not harm to the people.""' There scarcely is a better modern
usage of Locke's executive prerogative than executive orders to eradi-
cate race as an employment criterion.
The Federalist expressed no view corresponding to Locke's notion
of executive prerogative. It spoke, however, to conditions prompting
some of the orders examined in this Article. The framers recognized that
government must protect minorities from majority tyranny. 442 Madison
which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, includ-
ing those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three fifths of all other persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST, amend XIV, § 2.
457 Compare The Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268, 1269 (1863) ("I further declare
and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service
to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said
service."), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 432, at 420-21 with Exec.
Order No. 8802, 6 Fed, Reg. 3109 (1941) (policy goal identified as ending race discrimination
in the defense industry).
438 CfjOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas Peardon ed., 1952). Locke
describes establishment of the legislature as "the supreme power of the commonwealth," id. § 134,
and creation of executive power as "visibly subordinate and accountable to" legislative power, id.
§ 152, but also provides that the executive may be "vested in a single person, who has also a share
in the legislative [power]" in which case "that single person in a very tolerable sense may also he
called supreme." Id. § 151.
459 1d. § 159.
44° Id. § 160,
441 1d. § 210.
442 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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observed that in republican governments it is the legislative branch
that predominates and therefore threatens liberty. Quoting Jefferson's
Notes on the State of Virginia, Madison recounted:
All the powers of government, legislative, executive and judi-
ciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating these
in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic
government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be
exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one,
One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as
oppressive as one. 443
Numerous executive orders aimed to reverse de jure segrega-
tion.444 The official status of this discrimination amounted to majority
tyranny. Without the lawmaking characteristic of the executive order,
one can only imagine how much the Warren Court alone would have
checked this majoritarian abuse.
The fate of Executive Order 12,954 will help to define the twenty-
first century presidency. Federal courts must now choose whether these
presidents will be cabined to strictly limited roles as Commander in
Chief, drafter of treaties, and ministerial executor of laws, or will be
permitted to follow in the traditions of Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy in using the government's vast purchasing power to lead the
nation.
443 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 195 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1966)
(quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA).
444 See supra notes 150-54.
